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Twombly, Iqbal, and Rule 8(c):  
Assessing the Proper Standard to 
Apply to Affirmative Defenses 
James V. Bilek* 
“The history of procedure is a series of attempts to solve the problems 
created by the preceding generation’s procedural reforms.”1 
INTRODUCTION 
For almost fifty years, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure2 
have required parties simply to provide each other with fair 
notice of their claims or defenses.3  However, in 2007, the 
Supreme Court interpreted Rule 8 to mean something quite 
different.4  In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly5 and Ashcroft v. 
Iqbal,6 the Supreme Court changed the pleading standard from 
one requiring the complaint to provide the defendant with “fair 
notice” of the claim,7 to one requiring the complaint to contain 
 
 * J.D. Candidate, Chapman University School of Law, expected 2012.  For my 
family, especially my parents James and Karen Bilek, for without their support and 
guidance, I would surely have been unable to make it through law school, let alone write 
this Comment.  I would also like to especially thank my grandparents, Thomas and Anne 
Haldorsen, and Victor and Marion Bilek.  They have taught me so much about the value 
of hard work, family, and life in general, that I doubtless would be able to summarize it in 
words.  It is enough to say that they have shown me the importance of family in one’s life. 
 1 Judith Resnick, Precluding Appeals, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 603, 624 (1985). 
 2 Hereinafter, unless stated in full, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will be 
referred to simply as “the Rules.” 
 3 See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957) (“[A]ll the Rules require is ‘a short 
and plain statement of the claim’ that will give the defendant fair notice of what the 
plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2))), 
abrogated by Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).  See also Woodfield v. 
Bowman, 193 F.3d 354, 362 (5th Cir. 1999) (“An affirmative defense is subject to the same 
pleading requirements as is the complaint.”). 
 4 Rule 8 governs complaints and affirmative defenses in federal courts. See FED. R. 
CIV. P. 8(a) (governing complaints); FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c) (governing affirmative defenses). 
 5 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 6 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). 
 7 This “fair notice” standard was fairly simple for a plaintiff to meet. See Green 
Country Food Mkt., Inc. v. Bottling Grp., LLC, 371 F.3d 1275, 1279 (10th Cir. 2004) 
(holding that a complaint must give the defendant “‘fair notice of what the plaintiff’s 
claim is and the grounds upon which it rests’ . . . [but that a] plaintiff should not be 
prevented from pursuing a claim simply because of a failure to set forth in the complaint 
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“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 
face.”8  Yet, while the Court may have announced the standard 
for complaints, it was silent as to what to do with affirmative 
defenses pled in an answer.9  Must a defendant continue to 
simply provide the plaintiff with fair notice of the affirmative 
defense?10  Or, must the defendant’s answer now “contain 
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a[n 
affirmative defense] that is plausible on its face[?]’”11  Without an 
answer to these questions, defendants seeking to assert an 
affirmative defense will have little guidance as to what they must 
now include in their answers.  These questions and issues have 
inspired this Comment, which will examine how Twombly and 
Iqbal apply to affirmative defenses.  Ultimately, this Comment 
proposes that a defendant must “plead an adequate factual basis 
for [his or her] affirmative defense[],”12 without having to give 
rise to an affirmative defense which is ‘plausible on its face.’”13  
To require a defendant to make a plausibility assessment prior to 
pleading an affirmative defense would discourage defendants 
from pleading otherwise legitimate defenses out of fear that they 
may lack sufficient support to prove their plausibility.14 
 
a theory on which the plaintiff could recover . . . .” (quoting Conley, 355 U.S. at 47, 
abrogated by Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007))).  Thus, under this “notice” 
standard, facts were not necessarily required to be pled, and a plaintiff’s mere allegations 
may be enough. See, e.g., Comet Enters. Ltd. v. Air-A-Plane Corp., 128 F.3d 855, 860 (4th 
Cir. 1997) (upholding a complaint against a motion to dismiss despite failing to plead 
“that its claims are authorized by license” because even on a motion to dismiss, “a plaintiff 
need not come forward with all of the facts supporting its claim for relief”);; Atchinson v. 
District of Columbia, 73 F.3d 418, 421 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding that under a notice 
standard, complaints do “not [need] to state in detail the facts underlying a complaint”);; 
Christine L. Childers, Note, Keep on Pleading: The Co-Existence of Notice Pleading and 
the New Scope of Discovery Standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1), 36 VAL. 
U. L. REV. 677, 686–87 (2002) (noting that after Conley, pleadings were no longer used to 
develop the facts of a case). 
 8 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.  See also Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1953 (“Our decision in 
Twombly expounded the pleading standard for ‘all civil actions . . . .’” (quoting FED. R. CIV. 
P. 1)).   
 9 See infra Part III (noting the multitude of standards on which district courts have 
relied out of an uncertainty as to what the correct standard is to apply to an affirmative 
defense). 
 10 Prior to Twombly and Iqbal, this was the standard required of affirmative 
defenses. See, e.g., Davis v. Sun Oil Corp., 148 F.3d 606, 614 (6th Cir. 1998) (Boggs, J., 
dissenting) (“An affirmative defense may be pleaded in general terms and will be held to 
be sufficient . . . ‘as long as it gives plaintiff fair notice of the nature of the defense.’” 
(emphasis omitted) (quoting 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1381 (3d ed. 2010))). 
 11 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). 
 12 Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Hibbing Taconite Co., 266 F.R.D. 260, 268 
(D. Minn. 2009).  This would be the standard that a judge would apply on a Rule 12(f) 
motion to strike. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(f). 
 13 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).   
 14 An insufficiently pled affirmative defense is subject to being stricken under Rule 
12(f), which allows a plaintiff to move the court to strike an affirmative defense from the 
pleadings and the case. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(f) (“The court may strike from a pleading an 
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Part I will discuss how common law and code pleading gave 
way to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.15  Part II will trace 
the Court’s interpretation of Rule 8 from Conley v. Gibson16 to the 
Twombly and Iqbal decisions, as well as their effects on 
complaints and affirmative defenses.17  Part III will examine the 
standards that district courts are currently applying to 
affirmative defenses under Rule 8(c) in light of Twombly and 
Iqbal.18  Lastly, Part IV will propose how district courts should 
assess affirmative defenses today, taking into account such 
factors as the textual differences between Rule 8(a) and 8(c), the 
policies behind the Twombly and Iqbal decisions, as well as the 
overall fairness to a defendant and a plaintiff.19 
I.  FROM THE COMMON LAW TO THE CODES TO THE RULES 
Pleading regimes in the United States are largely derived as 
a reaction to the archaic and overly technical pleading standards 
of the common law.20  At common law, the pleadings were used as 
a mechanism to narrow the issues in dispute into one issue that 
could be decided by a judge or a jury.21  Each cause of action had 
 
insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.  
The court may act . . . on motion made by a party either before responding to the pleading 
or, if a response is not allowed, within 20 days after being served with the pleading.”).  
Thus, determining what exactly must be included in a responsive pleading by the 
defendant is an important topic for both litigators and defendants. 
 15 See infra Part I (describing common law and code pleading standards). 
 16 Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957), abrogated by Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 
U.S. 544 (2007). 
 17 See infra Part II (discussing the Twombly and Iqbal decisions). 
 18 See infra Part III (describing the different standards courts have adopted to assess 
the sufficiency of affirmative defenses pled in the answer). 
 19 See infra Part IV (discussing that an approach requiring facts to be pled is not 
only most fair to a defendant, but is most in line with the policies underlying the Twombly 
and Iqbal decisions). 
 20 See Linda S. Mullenix, Some Joy in Whoville: Rule 23(f), A Good Rulemaking, 69 
TENN. L. REV. 97, 98 (2001) (noting that the Rules were a “reaction to arcane common law 
pleading in England”);; Victor E. Schwartz & Christopher E. Appel, Rational Pleading in 
the Modern World of Civil Litigation: The Lessons and Public Policy Benefits of Twombly 
and Iqbal, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1107, 1109 (2010) (“[N]otice pleading developed in 
the 1930s as a reaction to arcane common law pleading rules and rigid code pleading.”).  
As will be discussed, code pleading was meant to replace the “technical common law,” and 
federal notice pleading was meant to replace “cumbersome” code pleading. Doug 
Rendleman, Simplification—A Civil Procedure Perspective, 105 DICK. L. REV. 241, 243 
(2001).  See also John Hasnas, What’s Wrong With a Little Tort Reform?, 32 IDAHO L. REV. 
557, 567 (1996) (describing code pleading as “arcane,” which is why it was replaced “in 
favor of more liberalized notice pleading.”). 
 21 See Thomas P. Gressette, Jr., The Heightened Pleading Standard of Bell Atlantic 
Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal: A New Phase in American Legal History Begins, 
58 DRAKE L. REV. 401, 404 (2009) (“The . . . pleading scheme was premised on the 
assumption that by proceeding through numerous stages of denial, avoidance, or 
demurrer, a case eventually would be reduced to a single dispositive issue of fact or law.” 
(quoting Christopher M. Fairman, Heightened Pleading, 81 TEX. L. REV. 551, 554 (2002))).  
See also ROY L. BROOKS, CRITICAL PROCEDURE 80 (Carolina Academic Press 1998) (“Issue 
formulation was the centerpiece of common law pleading.”);; WILLIAM F. WALSH, OUTLINES 
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its own separate pleading requirements.22  If the pleader failed to 
plead the cause of action properly, the pleader had to start all 
over again.23  Although there may have been benefits to such 
single issue pleading,24 a pleading regime which “stake[s] the 
outcome of litigation on the accuracy of a forecast that its merits 
will properly turn on the resolution of a single issue specifically 
 
OF THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH AND AMERICAN LAW 494 (New York University Press 1995) 
(describing how pleading at common law required parties to plead back and forth until 
one “precise issue” essential to the case was determined);; Clinton W. Francis, The 
Structure of Judicial Administration and the Development of Contract Law in 
Seventeenth-Century England, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 35, 56 (1983) (noting that at common 
law, the pleadings were used as a mechanism to narrow the “litigation to a single issue”); 
Howard T. Markey, Real-World Rules: Easing the Life of Litigation, 62 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 
421, 423 n.4 (1987–1988) (“At common law, pleadings served several purposes: giving 
notice of the nature of the claim, stating the facts, narrowing the issues to be litigated, 
and providing a means of quickly disposing of frivolous claims and meritless defenses.”). 
 22 See A.M. WILSHIRE, M.A., LL.B., PRINCIPLES OF THE COMMON LAW 10 (Sweet & 
Maxwell, Ltd. 1944).  A party wishing to file a complaint (or a declaration as it was 
known) had to follow the desired cause of action’s particular writ. See FLEMING JAMES, JR. 
& GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE 10–11 (Little, Brown and Co. 1977).  Each 
writ contained different requirements, which must be accurately pleaded or else the 
pleader failed and would be unable to proceed further with the writ. See Koan Mercer, 
“Even in These Days of Notice Pleadings”: Factual Pleading Requirements in the Fourth 
Circuit, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1167, 1168 (2004) (“The common law pleading practice that 
developed in England between the thirteenth and sixteenth centuries required plaintiffs 
to choose a single writ under which to bring their claims.  Each writ triggered a different 
form of action with distinct procedural, evidentiary, and jurisdictional requirements.”).  
Much of the displeasure stemming from common law pleading was a result of the 
technical requirements of these writs. See, e.g., Paul R. Sugarman & Marc G. Perlin, 
Proposed Changes to Discovery Rules in Aid of “Tort Reform”: Has the Case Been Made?, 
42 AM. U. L. REV. 1465, 1487 (1993) (“Common law pleading was prefigured and technical, 
shaped by the twelfth-century system of writs and formalistic pleading requirements.”). 
 23 JAMES & HAZARD, supra note 22, at 11.  Once a plaintiff and attorney decided on 
the proper cause of action, a myriad of pleading exchanges with the defendant followed. 
See Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 437 (1986).  Upon receiving the declaration, the 
defendant could demur, that is, admit the factual allegations, but deny that any legal 
basis existed for the claim, or plead to the declaration. See C. H. S. FIFOOT, M.A., ENGLISH 
LAW AND ITS BACKGROUND 153 (WM. W. Gaunt & Sons, Inc. 1993).  By doing this, if the 
defendant raised a new fact not originally brought forth, the plaintiff would now have to 
proceed as the defendant first did by admitting, denying, demurring, or pleading to it. See 
HERBERT BROOM, M. A., COMMENTARIES ON THE COMMON LAW, DESIGNED AS 
INTRODUCTORY TO ITS STUDY 177–78 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1997).  This would proceed 
anew if the plaintiff now raised a fact not raised by the declaration or by the defendant’s 
response. Id.  The pleadings would only cease if a fact raised by one is denied by the other, 
or an issue of law is asserted by one, but denied by the other. Id.  See also Thomas O. 
Main, Traditional Equity and Contemporary Procedure, 78 WASH. L. REV. 429, 454–55 
(2003) (“The system required an intricate network of highly technical rules designed to 
aid or force the parties’ dispute to converge upon a single issue of law or fact.”). 
 24 For example, such single issue pleading allowed a lay juror easily to resolve the 
main issue in the dispute, because instead of having to focus on multiple complex issues, 
the juror was left with one single issue which one party asserted and the other denied. See 
THEODORE F. T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 413 (Little, Brown 
and Co. 1956) (explaining that if the single issue left is one of fact, “then the parties will 
have ascertained a material fact which one asserts and the other denies in terms so 
precise that a jury will have no difficulty in hearing evidence on the matter and finding 
the truth of it”). 
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designated in advance, will be bound to cause many a 
miscarriage of justice.”25 
To break from this approach, many states adopted code 
pleading, which has its beginnings in the New York Code, known 
distinctly as the “Field Code.”26  Code pleading required parties 
to plead factual support for their claims or defenses,27 and 
necessarily focused on using the pleadings as a mechanism in 
which to develop facts.28  This assisted litigants greatly when it 
came to discovery as each side already had the factual basis for 
the other’s claims or defenses.29  Thus, code pleading, through 
factual development, focused on narrowing the issues for 
discovery and trial, without necessarily requiring that there be 
only one issue of law or fact left, as was required at common 
law.30   
Although code pleading narrowed the scope of discovery, 
oftentimes it was simply a difficult hurdle for litigators to 
overcome.31  “[T]he pleader faced the problem of distinguishing 
 
 25 Jonathan T. Molot, How Changes in the Legal Profession Reflect Changes in Civil 
Procedure, 84 VA. L. REV. 955, 981 (1998) (quoting Fleming James, Jr., The Objective and 
Function of the Complaint: Common Law—Codes—Federal Rules, 14 VAND. L. REV. 899, 
903 (1961)).  For a discussion of the difficulties of common law pleading, see CHARLES M. 
HEPBURN, THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CODE PLEADING IN AMERICA AND ENGLAND 
33 (2002) (describing pleading at common law as “a system of rigid formalism”). 
 26 See 4 B. E. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, PLEADING § 1 (5th ed. 2008). 
 27 See Martin B. Louis, Intercepting and Discouraging Doubtful Litigation: A Golden 
Anniversary View of Pleading, Summary Judgment, and Rule 11 Sanctions Under the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 67 N.C. L. REV. 1024, 1026 n.25 (1989) (“Code states 
adopted the infamous requirement that pleaders set forth the ‘ultimate facts,’ rather than 
‘conclusions of law’ or ‘evidentiary facts.’”). 
 28 See Roy L. Brooks, Critical Race Theory: A Proposed Structure and Application to 
Federal Pleading, 11 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 85, 100 (1994).  See also Harry Emmanuel 
Scozzaro, Jr., Note, Notice Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Following 
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A.: Standing on the Shoulders of Conley and Leatherman, 26 
AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 385, 411 (2002) (“Code pleading replaced the common law writ with 
facts and the form of action with the cause of action.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 29 See Mark D. Robins, The Resurgence and Limits of the Demurrer, 27 SUFFOLK U. 
L. REV. 637, 642 (1993).  Thus, code pleading largely assisted parties in determining the 
legitimacy of the other party’s claims or defenses. See Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity 
Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 
135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 939 (1987) (describing the purpose of code pleading as redressing 
the “legal rights subsisting between man and man in general”) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 30 Amelia F. Burroughs, Comment, Mythed It Again: The Myth of Discovery Abuse 
and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1), 33 MCGEORGE L. REV. 75, 78 (2001–2002).  
Compared with common law pleading, which was not as concerned with factual 
development as it was with issue formulation, code pleading marked a significant break 
from the common law. Molot, supra note 25, at 982–83 (explaining how at common law, 
issue formulation did not also necessarily entail factual development). 
 31 See Tony L. Wilcox, Schmidt v. McIlroy Bank & Trust: An Old Twist to a New 
Rule, 46 ARK. L. REV. 433, 437 (1993) (“The drafters of the code believed that code 
pleading would allow the pleader more freedom in bringing his action and would rid the 
court of the technical form and repetition of the common law system.  Yet, even though 
code pleading was much simpler, pleading problems persisted.  While the rigid forms of 
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facts from evidence and conclusions of law.  Many statements fit 
into both categories, and often it was impossible to make the 
distinction.”32  In 1938, however, the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure were enacted and took a drastic turn from the 
technical common law and the fact pleading requirements of the 
code regimes.33   
II.  THE EVOLVING STANDARDS OF FEDERAL PLEADING:  FROM A 
“NOTICE” STANDARD TO A “PLAUSIBILITY” STANDARD 
At the heart of pleading under the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure is Rule 8(a), which requires all complaints to contain 
“a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 
pleader is entitled to relief . . . .”34  In Conley v. Gibson,35 the 
Supreme Court interpreted Rule 8 to require that a complaint 
“give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and 
the grounds upon which it rests.”36  Affirmative defenses, on the 
 
action were abolished, there was no change in the substantive rights of the parties.”).  See 
also Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 987, 990 
(2003) (noting that code pleading, like common law pleading, concerned itself with 
technicalities such as differentiating between facts and conclusions of law).  A pleading 
was insufficient if it merely pled conclusions, and was devoid of any factual basis. See 
Wilcox, supra at 437–38 (explaining how under a code pleading regime, parties must only 
plead facts).  In an abundance of caution, parties often would plead too many facts in an 
attempt to avoid a demurrer. Id.  This “overpleading” led to high costs and delays and, 
thus, instead of providing the actual factual support for a claim or defense, a party was 
simply left with a myriad of facts, but little direction as to which actually applied. Id. 
 32 Wilcox, supra note 31, at 437.  Despite these concerns, twenty-eight states 
currently maintain a code pleading system in one form or another. HEPBURN, supra note 
25, at 92–113.  Specifically, the states are: Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, 
Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Minnesota, Missouri, 
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, 
Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Id. 
 33 See Sanjuan v. Am. Bd. of Psychiatry & Neurology Inc., 40 F.3d 247, 251 (7th Cir. 
1994) (holding that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure eliminated any need to plead 
facts in the complaint), amended by No. 94-1585, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 565 (7th Cir. Jan. 
11, 1995).  As code and common law pleading were often criticized for focusing on the 
technical requirements of the pleadings, rather than the substantive merits of the claim, 
the Rules were a notable response to these criticisms, and emphasized simple pleading 
with broad and easy access to discovery, which is much more adept at uncovering the 
facts and issues of a case. See JAMES & HAZARD, supra note 22, at 22 (noting that an 
important function under the Rules is its “simplicity and liberal amendment in pleading 
and motion practice”);; Morgan Cloud, The 2000 Amendments to the Federal Discovery 
Rules and the Future of Adversarial Pretrial Litigation, 74 TEMP. L. REV. 27, 52 (2001) 
(“One of the central reforms of the . . . Rules was to abandon the lengthy and technical 
requirements of earlier common law and code pleading.  Because the Rules’ drafters 
believed that those forms of pleading had been a primary cause of litigation delay, 
expense, inconvenience, and emphasized procedural games over the substantive merits of 
the disputes, they embraced notice pleading, with its bare bones and easy to satisfy 
requirements for stating a claim.”). 
 34 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). 
 35 Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957), abrogated by Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 
U.S. 544 (2007). 
 36 Conley, 355 U.S. at 47.  Furthermore, according to Conley, complaints are 
sufficient “unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in 
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other hand, are governed by Rule 8(c), which requires a 
defendant to “affirmatively state any avoidance or affirmative 
defense . . . .”37  Under the pre-Twombly standards, affirmative 
defenses were held to the same Conley notice requirements as 
was the complaint.38  Thus, raising an affirmative defense in the 
answer was meant simply to provide the opposing party with 
notice and allow that party to use the tools of discovery to further 
develop the basis of the defense.39  Despite subsequent Supreme 
Court decisions affirming this notice standard,40 in 2007, the 
 
support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Id. at 45–46.  See also Walter W. 
Heiser, A Critical Review of the Local Rules of the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of California, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 555, 568 n.64 (1996) (noting that 
Conley rejected a requirement that the pleadings contain all the necessary facts of the 
claim or defense).  The purpose of this lax standard was to allow parties an easy means of 
access to discovery and thereby give the parties control over which facts and issues are 
uncovered. See Sherman J. Clark, To Thine Own Self Be True: Enforcing Candor in 
Pleading Through the Party Admissions Doctrine, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 565, 584 (1998) 
(explaining that under the Conley notice standard, parties did not have to concern 
themselves with setting forth facts and establishing their claims or defenses prior to 
discovery).  Thus, contrary to common law and code pleading concerns about narrowing 
the issues for trial, federal pleading, prior to Twombly and Iqbal, was much more 
concerned with preventing a party from forgoing a legitimate claim on the doubt that that 
party lacked factual specificity at the time of filing the complaint. Id.  Pleading under the 
Rules was not meant to trap or trick a party, but was only meant to act as a means to 
achieve an end to the litigation which was decided on the truth of the issues. See Maurice 
Rosenberg, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Action: Assessing Their Impact, 137 U. PA. 
L. REV. 2197, 2207 (1989). 
 37 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c)(1). 
 38 See Woodfield v. Bowman, 193 F.3d 354, 362 (5th Cir. 1999).  See also Instituto 
Nacional De Comercializacion Agricola (Indeca) v. Cont’l Il. Nat’l Bank and Trust Co., 576 
F. Supp. 985, 988 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (holding that affirmative defenses are “subject to the 
general pleading requirements of Rules 8(a), 8(e) and 9(b), generally requiring only a 
short and plain statement of the facts but demanding particularity as to the 
circumstances constituting fraud and mistake”). 
 39 See Fed. Election Comm’n v. Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am., 254 F.3d 173, 189 (D.C. Cir. 
2001).  See also FLEMING JAMES, JR., GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & JOHN LEUBSDORF, CIVIL 
PROCEDURE 250 (5th ed. 2001) (explaining that Rule 8(c) is only meant to give the 
plaintiff fair notice of the affirmative defense planned to be asserted at trial). 
 40 See, e.g., Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 511 (2002) (holding that, in 
an employment discrimination suit brought “under a notice pleading system,” the facts 
establishing plaintiff’s claim are not required to be pled); Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. 
Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993) (holding that a 
heightened pleading requirement in a civil rights action is inconsistent “with the liberal 
system of ‘notice pleading’ set up by the Federal Rules”).  For a discussion on the 
relationship between Swierkiewicz, Leatherman, and Conley, see Scozzaro, supra note 28, 
at 432 (“In light of Conley, Leatherman, and now Swierkiewicz, a full scale amending of 
Rule 8 seems unlikely”).  There are also a host of lower federal appellate courts affirming 
and applying this notice standard. See, e.g., Miller v. Am. Heavy Lift Shipping, 231 F.3d 
242, 247 (6th Cir. 2000) (“There can be no dispute that our modern rules of civil procedure 
are based on the concept of ‘simplified notice pleading . . . .’” (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 
355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957), abrogated by Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)) 
(internal quotations omitted)); C.H. v. Oliva, 226 F.3d 198, 206 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding 
that complaints only need to provide the defendant with “fair notice of . . . the plaintiff’s 
claim . . . .” (quoting Conley, 355 U.S. at 47, abrogated by Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 
U.S. 544 (2007))); Monahan v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Corr., 214 F.3d 275, 283 (2d Cir. 2000) 
(holding that under the Rules, the opposing party is only required to be provided with 
“notice of the claim or defense to be litigated . . . .” (citing Conley, 355 U.S. at 47–48, 
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Supreme Court interpreted Rule 8 to require a plausibility 
standard, not a notice requirement.41  In Twombly, while ruling 
on the sufficiency of an antitrust complaint, the Court held that 
“[t]he need at the pleading stage for allegations plausibly 
suggesting . . . agreement reflects Rule 8(a)(2)’s threshold 
requirement that the ‘plain statement’ possess enough heft to 
‘show that the pleader is entitled to relief.’”42  The Court cited 
concerns over the cost of litigation and reasoned that such a 
heightened pleading requirement is necessary to prevent 
excessive and unnecessarily expensive discovery in cases with no 
“reasonably founded hope that the discovery process will reveal 
relevant [information] . . . .”43 
Following Twombly, there was uncertainty in lower federal 
courts as to the exact standard to apply to all complaints, not 
simply those involving an antitrust claim.44  Then, in Ashcroft v. 
Iqbal,45 the Court definitively closed the door on Conley, at least 
 
abrogated by Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007))). 
 41 See infra notes 47–50 and accompanying text (describing Twombly’s and Iqbal’s 
plausibility requirement). 
 42 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007). 
 43 Id. at 559.  This reasoning is a drastic departure from Conley, which concerned 
itself not with controlling the scope of discovery, but with providing litigants with a 
means to access discovery. See Conley, 355 U.S. at 47–48 (holding that the ease of access 
to discovery under the Rules is meant to provide parties with the ability to uncover the 
factual basis for the other’s claims or defenses and it is because of this that the Rules 
adopt notice pleading), abrogated by Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).  
Thus, Conley and its progeny believed that the pleadings should not be used for factual 
and issue development, but rather, that the litigants, with the tools of discovery, would do 
this themselves. See Taylor v. Belger Cartage Serv., Inc., 102 F.R.D. 172, 180–81 (W.D. 
Mo. 1984) (discussing that attorneys need the liberal discovery processes of the Rules “to 
explore and develop facts to support established or reasonable extensions of established 
legal theories”);; James E. Brown, Note, Civil Procedure—Standing and Direct Review in 
Appellate Court—Center for Auto Safety v. National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration, 793 F.2d 1322 (D.C. Cir. 1986), 60 TEMP. L.Q. 1045, 1056 n.97 (1987) 
(describing Conley’s intentions to use discovery, not pleadings, for factual development).  
However, with the Twombly and Iqbal decisions, the complaint will now be used as a form 
of factual development, in lieu of discovery. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 
(2009) (holding that a complaint must now contain some factual basis). 
 44 See, e.g., TalentBurst, Inc. v. Collabera, Inc., 567 F. Supp. 2d 261, 269–70 (D. 
Mass. 2008) (applying Twombly to a tortious interference complaint); Dahl v. Bain Capital 
Partners, L.L.C., 589 F. Supp. 2d 112, 117 (D. Mass. 2008) (holding that Twombly only 
applies to “a claim under § 1 of the Sherman Act.”).  Considering some of the language 
used in the Twombly decision, it is difficult to fault the courts for their uncertainty. See 
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (“In applying these general standards to a § 1 claim, we hold 
that stating such a claim requires a complaint with enough factual matter (taken as true) 
to suggest that an agreement was made.” (emphasis added));; Id. at 554–55 (“This case 
presents the antecedent question of what a plaintiff must plead in order to state a claim 
under § 1 of the Sherman Act.” (emphasis added)).  See also Ettie Ward, The After-Shocks 
of Twombly: Will We “Notice” Pleading Changes?, 82 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 893, 906–10 
(2008) (discussing the problems that lower federal courts will have to grapple with in a 
post-Twombly world). 
 45 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1944. 
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as applied to complaints.46  In Iqbal, the Court clarified that 
“Twombly expounded the pleading standard for ‘all civil 
actions . . . .’”47  The Court further explained that Rule 8(a) 
requires complaints to “contain sufficient factual matter, 
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 
face.’”48  This is a two-part analysis, which first requires the court 
to determine the statements that are factual support for the 
complaint, which are treated as true, and the statements that are 
merely conclusory allegations, which the court will not treat as 
true.49  Having identified those statements that are afforded the 
benefit of truth, the reviewing court must determine whether the 
factual allegations state “a plausible claim for relief,” which will 
require the “court to draw on its judicial experience and common 
sense.”50  Although the Court in Iqbal clarified that the 
heightened pleading requirement of Twombly applies to all 
complaints, the decision was silent as to whether this standard 
applies to affirmative defenses.51  With this uncertainty, 
defendants and lower federal courts have been left to determine 
 
 46 Id. at 1953 (holding that Twombly’s plausibility standard applies to all 
complaints); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563 (holding that Conley’s notice standard did not set 
forth the “minimum standard of adequate pleading” for complaints).  As will be discussed 
though, many courts are still adhering to Conley’s notice pleading standard when 
assessing an affirmative defense. See infra Parts III(B)–(C)(i).   
 47 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1953 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 1). 
 48 Id. at 1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). 
 49 Id.  Although legal conclusions may be necessary to frame a complaint, “they must 
be supported by factual allegations.” Id. at 1950. 
 50 Id.  Whatever precisely this plausibility standard will require of a district court 
judge is an issue beyond the scope of this Comment.  This Comment does not focus on 
what the plausibility test actually means, but rather, what test should apply to an 
affirmative defense.  For a discussion of what the test does or should mean, see Charles B. 
Campbell, A “Plausible” Showing After Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 9 NEV. L.J. 1, 29 
(2008) (describing the plausibility standard as one that will necessarily fluctuate 
depending on the type of case presented); Schwartz & Appel, supra note 20, at 1127 
(arguing that a plausibility standard is not a concrete standard on which to assess a 
complaint); Adam N. Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1293, 1293 (2010) 
(arguing that the plausibility standard is inconsistent with the Rules and prior Supreme 
Court decisions); Nicholas Tymoczko, Note, Between the Possible and the Probable: 
Defining the Plausibility Standard After Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. 
Iqbal, 94 MINN. L. REV. 505, 530 (2009) (“The plausibility standard is best understood as 
an inferential standard unrelated to notice that is used to assess the substantive 
sufficiency of a complaint.”). 
 51 See infra notes 144–45 and accompanying text (noting the lack of language in 
Twombly and Iqbal that would indicate that those decisions were meant to apply to 
affirmative defenses).  See also Manuel John Dominguez, William B. Lewis & Anne F. 
O’Berry, The Plausibility Standard as a Double-Edged Sword: The Application of 
Twombly and Iqbal to Affirmative Defenses, 84 FLA. B.J. 77, 77 (2010) (“Twombly’s 
application to affirmative defenses has not been widely discussed.”);; Arthur R. Miller, 
From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
60 DUKE L.J. 1, 101 (2010) (“Somewhat uncertain, however, are Twombly’s and Iqbal’s 
applicability to denials and affirmative defenses.”);; Ryan Mize, From Plausibility to 
Clarity: An Analysis of the Implications of Ashcroft v. Iqbal and Possible Remedies, 58 U. 
KAN. L. REV. 1245, 1260–61 (2010) (noting that courts after Iqbal have to determine what 
standard applies to affirmative defenses). 
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what must be pled in an affirmative defense.  Without clear 
guidance though, the lower courts have split and are not 
applying one clear uniform standard, thus leaving the 
affirmative defense in a current state of disarray.52 
III.  IN LIGHT OF TWOMBLY AND IQBAL, DISTRICT COURTS ARE 
APPLYING A MULTITUDE OF STANDARDS TO AFFIRMATIVE 
DEFENSES 
Although over sixty district courts have ruled on the 
applicability of Twombly and Iqbal to affirmative defenses,53 as of 
this publication, no Court of Appeals has directly ruled on the 
issue.54  District courts, however, have developed a multitude of 
standards to assess an affirmative defense in light of Twombly 
and Iqbal.55  Due to this lack of uniformity, the majority of courts 
do not apply the plausibility standard.  Rather, the courts’ 
decisions can be parsed into one of the following categories: (1) 
district courts which apply Twombly and Iqbal’s plausibility and 
fact pleading requirements;56 (2) district courts which reject 
Twombly and Iqbal because Rule 8(a) and 8(c) do not have 
 
 52 Despite the uncertain state of the affirmative defense, there is little scholarly 
work on the issue.  Two articles argue for the extension of the plausibility standard to 
affirmative defenses. See Melanie A. Goff & Richard A. Bales, A “Plausible” Defense: 
Applying Twombly and Iqbal to Affirmative Defenses, 34 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 
(forthcoming Spring 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1846918; Joseph Seiner, Plausibility Beyond the Complaint, 53 
WM & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1721062.  One article argues that the plausibility standard 
should not be extended to affirmative defenses. See Anthony Gambol, The Twombly 
Standard and Affirmative Defenses: What is Good for the Goose is Not Good for the 
Gander, 79 FORD. L. REV. 2173, 2205 (2011).  However, Gambol differs from this 
Comment as Gambol argues that the affirmative defense standard should not be modified 
at all, and should remain as the Conley notice standard.  This Comment, however, argues 
that such a standard is unfair to the plaintiff, and thus, the affirmative defense pleading 
standard must be modified.   
 53 See infra Part III (describing the different approaches courts have taken in 
assessing the sufficiency of an affirmative defense pled in an answer). 
 54 See Falley v. Friends Univ., No. 10-1423-CM, 2011 WL 1429956, at *1 (D. Kan. 
Apr. 14, 2011) (noting that no appellate court has decided the issue of whether the 
pleading standards of Twombly and Iqbal apply to affirmative defenses); FTC v. Hope 
Now Modifications, LLC, No. 09-1204, 2011 U.S. Dist LEXIS 24657, at *5 (D.N.J. Mar. 10, 
2011) (“[T]he Court’s research confirms, that no Federal Circuit Court has yet considered 
whether to extend the pleading requirements of Twombly and Iqbal to affirmative 
defenses.”);; Racick v. Dominion Law Assocs., No. 5:10-CV-66-F, 2010 U.S. Dist LEXIS 
107105, at *10 (E.D.N.C. Oct. 6, 2010) (“Neither the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, nor 
any other circuit court of appeals, has addressed whether Twombly and Iqbal should be 
interpreted as applying to affirmative defenses.”); Del-Nat Tire Corp. v. A To Z Tire & 
Battery, Inc., No. 2:09-cv-02457-JPM-tmp., 2009 WL 4884435, at *2 (W.D. Tenn. Dec. 8, 
2009) (“Neither the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals nor any of the other Court of Appeals 
have addressed this issue . . . .”). 
 55 See infra Part III. 
 56 See infra Part III(A) (describing various courts’ applications of the plausibility 
standard to affirmative defenses). 
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identical language;57 and (3) district courts which do not 
explicitly accept or reject Twombly and Iqbal, but rather adopt a 
standard inconsistent with those decisions.58 
A. District Courts That Explicitly Adopt Twombly and Iqbal 
Are Holding Affirmative Defenses to a Plausibility Standard 
A number of district courts interpreted Twombly and Iqbal 
as announcing a universal pleading standard and, thus, apply 
the two-part plausibility standard to affirmative defenses. 
In Grovernor House, L.L.C., v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours and 
Co.,59 the plaintiff filed a motion to strike an affirmative defense 
pled by the defendant which simply alleged: “[Plaintiff] assumed 
the risk associated with the design of the canopy.”60  In holding 
that Twombly’s and Iqbal’s plausibility standard applies to 
affirmative defenses, the court reasoned that affirmative 
defenses, like complaints, are subject to Rule 8(a) and its 
pleading requirements.61  Thus, the court was adopting the 
reasoning of pre-Twombly courts that affirmative defenses and 
complaints are subject to the same requirements,62 despite the 
fact that different rules govern each pleading.63  In assessing the 
particular affirmative defense at issue in this case, the court 
granted the motion to strike because the defense was a “bare 
legal conclusion.”64  By failing to plead any facts, the pleading 
failed “to suggest that a defense is plausible on its face.”65 
 
 57 See infra Part III(B) (describing how certain courts have rejected the Twombly 
and Iqbal requirements as the Rules do not set forth the same standard for an affirmative 
defense as they do for a complaint). 
 58 See infra Part III(C).  This category can be further sub-divided into courts which 
adopt: (i) a notice pleading standard; (ii) a fact pleading standard; or (iii) a standard 
which makes the factual particularity required depend on the defense pled.  For a 
discussion arguing that the majority of district courts are adopting a plausibility 
standard, while a minority are rejecting the plausibility standard, or applying a hybrid of 
both, see Dominguez et al., supra note 51, at 77. 
 59 Grovernor House, L.L.C., v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours and Co., No. 09-21698-Civ-
COOKE/BANDSTRA, 2010 U.S. Dist LEXIS 91905 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 12, 2010). 
 60 Id. at *11. 
 61 Id. at *4. 
 62 See Woodfield v. Bowman, 193 F.3d 354, 362 (5th Cir. 1999). 
 63 Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) (“A pleading that states a claim for relief must 
contain . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled 
to relief . . . .”), with FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c)(1) (“In responding to a pleading, a party must 
affirmatively state any avoidance or affirmative defense . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 64 Grovernor House, L.L.C., 2010 U.S. Dist LEXIS 91905 at *11. 
 65 Id. at *12.  This is certainly a Twombly and Iqbal analysis as it required the court 
to “draw on its judicial experience and common sense” in making its plausibility 
determination. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009).  Furthermore, this 
analysis mirrors one that a judge would perform on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss a 
complaint. See, e.g., Wilson v. Price, 624 F.3d 389, 391–92 (7th Cir. 2010) (holding that 
when faced with a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, if the complaint does not state a plausible 
claim for relief, “the plaintiff pleads itself out of court” (quoting Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 
526 F.3d 1074, 1084 (7th Cir. 2008))); Hinton v. Dennis, 362 F. App’x 904, 906 (10th Cir. 
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Furthermore, in Safeco Insurance Co. of America v. O’Hara 
Corp.,66 the court expounded on some of the policy reasons behind 
adopting the Twombly and Iqbal requirements for affirmative 
defenses.67  In applying the Twombly and Iqbal standard,68 the 
court reasoned that by simply allowing the defendant to list any 
affirmative defense without providing factual support, the 
defendant was creating “unnecessary work” for the court and the 
plaintiff.69  As such defenses require discovery, allowing any legal 
conclusion to be sufficient will require every plaintiff to 
determine “which defenses are truly at issue and which are 
merely asserted without factual basis but in an abundance of 
caution.”70 
Perhaps the most illustrative example of this concern over 
discovery issues occurred in the following decision.  In Palmer v. 
Oakland Farms, Inc.,71 the defendant pled eighteen affirmative 
defenses, and the court struck eleven for being conclusory.72  In 
applying the Twombly and Iqbal rule, the court reasoned that 
discovery should not be used to determine the legitimacy of a 
defense, but instead should be used to uncover additional facts 
supporting the defense.73 
A number of cases expressed unease in having separate 
pleading standards for plaintiffs and defendants as it would not 
only be unfair, but would make it difficult for the court to 
determine the sufficiency of an affirmative defense on a motion to 
strike.74  In Castillo v. Roche Laboratories, Inc.,75 the court struck 
 
2010) (holding that when ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the complaint must 
contain “specific factual allegations that support a plausible legal claim for relief”);; Kay v. 
Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1218 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding that when faced with a 12(b)(6) 
motion to dismiss, the complaint must contain “specific allegations” supporting a 
plausible claim for relief (quoting Alvarado v. KOB-TV, L.L.C., 493 F.3d 1210, 1215 (10th 
Cir. 2007))), appeal dismissed, 500 F.3d 1214 (10th Cir. 2007); Ridge at Red Hawk, L.L.C. 
v. Schneider, 493 F.3d 1174, 1177 (10th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he mere metaphysical possibility 
that some plaintiff could prove some set of facts in support of the pleaded claims is 
insufficient; the complaint must give the court reason to believe that this plaintiff has a 
reasonable likelihood of mustering factual support for these claims.”). 
 66 Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. O’Hara Corp., No. 08-CV-10545, 2008 WL 2558015 (E.D. 
Mich. June 25, 2008). 
 67 Id. at *1. 
 68 Id. (affirmative defense “must state ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is 
plausible on its face’” (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547 (2007))). 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Palmer v. Oakland Farms, Inc., No. 5:10cv00029, 2010 WL 2605179 (W.D. Va. 
June 24, 2010). 
 72 Id. at *1, *6. 
 73 Id. at *5.  Furthermore, in Barnes v. AT&T Pension Benefit Plan-Nonbargained 
Program, the defendant pled twenty-four affirmative defenses consisting largely of 
“conclusory statements.” 718 F. Supp. 2d 1167, 1172 (N.D. Cal. 2010).  The court held 
these to the Twombly and Iqbal standard and struck thirteen of them. Id. at 1173.   
 74 See United States v. Quadrini, No. 2:07-CV-132227, 2007 WL 4303213, at *4 (E.D. 
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the defendant’s affirmative defense for failing to meet the 
plausibility requirements of Twombly and Iqbal.76  One defense 
simply stated: “Plaintiff’s [c]omplaint fails, in whole or in part, to 
state a claim upon which relief may be granted,”77 and was 
struck for being a “bare-bones, conclusory statement[] without 
any factual allegations.”78  The court dismissed the argument 
that it is unfair to hold a defendant, who has only days to 
answer, to the same standard as a plaintiff, who may have 
prepared his or her case for years.79  As “boilerplate defenses . . . 
require significant unnecessary discovery,”80 the court has to hold 
a high amount of pretrial conferences and respond to ill-founded 
summary judgment motions.81  With a basis of the underlying 
facts needed to support the affirmative defenses, the court has 
much greater control over the discovery process.82 
 
Mich. Dec. 6, 2007).  See also Racick v. Dominion Law Assocs., 270 F.R.D. 228, 234 
(E.D.N.C. 2010) (“‘[T]he considerations of fairness, common sense and litigation efficiency’ 
underlying Twombly and Iqbal’ mandate that the same pleading requirements apply 
equally to complaints and affirmative defenses.” (quoting Francisco v. Verizon S. Inc., No. 
3:09cv737, 2010 U.S. Dist LEXIS 77083, at *7 (E.D. Va. July 29, 2010))); Topline 
Solutions, Inc. v. Sandler Sys., Inc., No. L-09-3102, 2010 WL 2998836, at *1 (D. Md. July 
27, 2010) (“[I]t would be incongruous and unfair to require a plaintiff to operate under one 
standard and to permit the defendant to operate under a different, less stringent 
standard.”);; Hayne v. Green Ford Sales, Inc., 263 F.R.D. 647, 650 (D. Kan. 2009) (“It 
makes no sense to find that a heightened pleading standard applies to claims but not to 
affirmative defenses.”). 
 75 Castillo v. Roche Labs., No. 10-20876-CIV, 2010 WL 3027726 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 2, 
2010). 
 76 Id. at *1. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. at *3 (emphasis omitted). 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. 
 82 Id.  For courts employing similar reasoning, see HCRI TRS Acquirer, L.L.C. v. 
Iwer, III, 708 F. Supp. 2d 687, 691 (N.D. Ohio 2010) (“Boilerplate affirmative defenses 
that provide little or no factual support can have the same detrimental effect on the cost 
of litigation as poorly worded complaints.”);; Francisco v. Verizon S., Inc., No. 3:09cv737, 
2010 WL 2990159, at *7 (E.D. Va. July 29, 2010) (“An even-handed standard as related to 
pleadings ensures that the affirmative defenses supply enough information to explain the 
parameters of and basis for an affirmative defense such that the adverse party can 
reasonably tailor discovery.”);; Bradshaw v. Hilco Receivables, L.L.C., 725 F. Supp. 2d 532, 
536 (D. Md. 2010) (“The application of the Twombly and Iqbal standard to defenses 
will . . . discourage defendants from asserting boilerplate affirmative defenses that are 
based upon nothing more than ‘some conjecture that [they] may somehow apply.’” 
(quoting Hayne v. Green Ford Sales, Inc., 263 F.R.D. 647, 650 (2009))); Carretta v. May 
Trucking Co., No. 09-158-MJR, 2010 WL 1139099, at *1 (S.D. Ill. Mar. 19, 2010) (holding 
that affirmative defenses “must be ‘plausible,’ raising ‘a reasonable expectation that 
discovery will reveal evidence’ supporting the allegations” (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007))); Burget v. Capital W. Sec., Inc., No. CIV-09-1015-M, 
2009 WL 4807619, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 8, 2009) (“An even-handed standard as related 
to pleadings ensures that the affirmative defenses supply enough information to explain 
the parameters of and basis for an affirmative defense such that the adverse party can 
reasonably tailor discovery.”). 
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The courts adopting this standard are focused on judicial 
economy through narrowing the scope of discovery at the 
pleading phase.83  This clearly mirrors the Court’s concerns in 
Twombly and Iqbal as applied to a plaintiff, because to have to 
sort through a host of affirmative defenses to determine which 
actually have validity is costly and burdensome to a plaintiff.84 
 
 83 Instead of allowing parties to simply list affirmative defenses, as was allowed 
prior to Twombly, these decisions in an effort to narrow the scope of discovery are 
requiring enough factual support to state a plausible affirmative defense. See, e.g., 
Teirstein v. AGA Med. Corp., No. 6:08cv14, 2009 WL 704138, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 16, 
2009) (noting that “in some cases, merely pleading the name of the affirmative defense . . . 
may be sufficient”).  However, as will be discussed, this standard has not been uniformly 
accepted. 
 84 See Palmer v. Oakland Farms, Inc., No. 5:10cv00029, 2010 WL 2605179, at *5 
(W.D. Va. June 24, 2010) (“[A] plaintiff [should] not be left to the formal discovery process 
to find-out whether the defense exists [but should], instead, use the discovery process for 
its intended purpose of ascertaining the additional facts which support a well-pleaded 
claim or defense.”).  In addition to Palmer, for additional district court decisions which 
hold that Twombly and Iqbal apply to affirmative defenses, see Groupon Inc. v. MobGob 
L.L.C., No. 10 C 7456, 2011 WL 2111986, at *2 (N.D. Ill. May 25, 2011) (“[D]espite 
potentially valid policy arguments for holding affirmative defenses to a lower pleading 
standard than complaints . . . the Court must apply the same standards, including those 
expressed recently by the Supreme Court in Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal . . . .” 
(citations omitted)); Sanders v. Cont’l Collection Agency, Ltd., No. 11-cv-00448-CMA-
MJW, 2011 WL 1706911, at *1 (D. Co. May 5, 2011) (holding that Iqbal and Twombly 
apply to affirmative defenses); Shaw v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, No. 10-03355-CV-
W-DGK, 2011 WL 1050004, at *2 (W.D. Mo. Mar. 21, 2011) (holding Iqbal and Twombly 
apply to affirmative defenses); United States S.E.C. v. Sachdeva, No. 10-C-747, 2011 WL 
933967, at *1 (E.D. Wis. Mar. 16, 2011) (holding Twombly and Iqbal apply to affirmative 
defenses); Lucas v. Jerusalem Café, LLC, No. 4:10-cv-00582-DGK, 2011 WL 1364075 
(W.D. Mo. Apr. 11, 2011) (holding that Iqbal’s and Twombly’s plausibility standard 
applies to affirmative defenses); School of the Ozarks, Inc. v. Greatest Generations 
Found., No. 10-3499-CV-S-ODS, 2011 WL 1337406, at *1 (W.D. Mo. Apr. 7, 2011) 
(applying the plausibility standard to affirmative defenses); U.S. v. Brink, No. C-10-243, 
2011 WL 835828, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 4, 2011) (holding that Twombly and Iqbal apply to 
affirmative defenses); Burns v. Dodeka, L.L.C., No. 4:09-CV-19-BJ, 2010 WL 1903987, at 
*1 (N.D. Tex. May 11, 2010) (striking affirmative defenses that “are wholly conclusory and 
fail to plead any facts that demonstrate the plausibility of such defenses as required by 
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly . . . ”);; OSF Healthcare Sys. v. Banno, No. 08-1096, 2010 
WL 431963, at *2 (C.D. Ill. Jan. 29, 2010) (holding that Twombly and Iqbal “dealt with 
whether a complaint’s allegations satisfied pleading requirements, but their statements 
seem equally applicable to affirmative defenses, given that affirmative defenses are 
subject to those same pleading requirements”);; AET Rail Grp., L.L.C. v. Siemens Transp. 
Sys., Inc., No. 08-CV-6442, 2009 WL 5216960, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 2009) (“Twombly 
does not require that the complaint (or here, the Answer with affirmative defenses) 
provide ‘detailed factual allegations,’ . . . however, it must ‘amplify a claim with some 
factual allegations . . . to render the claim plausible.’” (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)) (quoting Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 157–58 (2d Cir. 2007), 
rev’d sub nom. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009))); Premium Standard Farms, 
L.L.C. v. Travelers Prop. & Cas. Co. of Am., No. 09-0699-CV-W-GAF, 2009 WL 4907063, 
at *1 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 14, 2009) (holding defendant “has stated plausible affirmative 
defenses . . . ”);; Bank of Montreal v. SK Foods, L.L.C., No. 09 C 3479, 2009 WL 3824668, 
at *3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 13, 2009) (striking affirmative defenses for being implausible); Tracy 
v. NVR, Inc., No. 04-CV-6541L, 2009 WL 3153150, at *7 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2009) (“[T]he 
Twombly plausibility standard applies with equal force to a motion to strike an 
affirmative defense under Rule 12(f).”);; In re Mission Bay Ski & Bike, Inc., Nos. 07 B 
20870, 08 A 55, 2009 WL 2913438, at *6 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Sept. 9, 2009) (“Affirmative 
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B. District Courts That Explicitly Reject Twombly’s and Iqbal’s 
Plausibility Standard Are Applying Conley’s Notice Pleading 
Standard 
Focusing on the textual differences between Rule 8(a) and 
Rule 8(c), the following decisions explicitly rejected the Twombly 
and Iqbal standard. 
In FTC v. Hope Now Modifications, the court rejected an 
argument that an affirmative defense must be pled with 
plausible support because “the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
distinguish the level of pleading required between a plaintiff 
asserting a claim for relief under Rule 8(a) and a defendant 
asserting an affirmative defense under Rule 8(c).”85  When a 
defendant pleads an affirmative defense, the defendant does not 
seek a “claim for relief” within Rule 8(a).86  Thus, the simple Rule 
8(c) standard should apply, and a defendant need only “state” the 
affirmative defense.87 
In McLemore v. Regions Bank,88 the court allowed an 
affirmative defense to stand despite the fact that it only stated 
that: “Plaintiffs’ fault is comparatively greater than any fault of 
[defendant’s].”89  The court held that the Twombly and Iqbal 
decisions did not affect the pleading standard for affirmative 
defenses.90  The court reasoned that the Supreme Court in 
Twombly and Iqbal was not interpreting Rule 8(c), but rather 
was only interpreting Rule 8(a)(2)’s requirement that a complaint 
be stated with “a short and plain statement of the claim showing 
that the pleader is entitled to relief.”91  Although Rule 8(b) and 
Rule 8(a) both require an answer or a complaint to be stated in 
“short and plain terms,” Rule 8(c) is the applicable standard 
 
defenses are pleadings and so are subject to all pleading requirements under the Federal 
Rules. . . .  [Thus,] [t]he facts alleged must be sufficient not only to give notice of the 
nature of the claim but to show the claim ‘is plausible on its face.’” (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. 
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 
(2009)));; Magicon, L.L.C. v. Weatherford Int’l, Inc., Nos. 4:08-cv-03639, 4:08-cv-03636, 
2009 U.S. Dist LEXIS 126500, at *6 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 10, 2009) (holding affirmative 
defenses “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true” to state a plausible 
defense); JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Mal Corp., No. 07 C 2034, 2009 U.S. Dist LEXIS 
23540, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 26, 2009) (“[A]n affirmative defense need only articulate ‘a 
plausible set of underlying facts.’” (quoting SEG Liquidation Co., L.L.C. v. Stevenson, No. 
07 C 3456, 2008 WL 623626, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 6, 2008))). 
 85 FTC v. Hope Now Modifications, L.L.C., No. 09-1204 (JBS/JS), 2011 WL 883202, 
at *3 (D.N.J. Mar. 10, 2011). 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. at *2. 
 88 McLemore v. Regions Bank, Nos. 3:08-cv-0021, 3:08-cv-1003, 2010 WL 1010092 
(M.D. Tenn. Mar. 18, 2010). 
 89 Id. at *12. 
 90 Id. at *13. 
 91 Id. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 
555 (2007))). 
Do Not Delete 12/17/2011 11:47 AM 
392 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 15:2 
when assessing an affirmative defense, not Rule 8(b).92  Thus, the 
above-pled affirmative defense was sufficient because it only 
needs to be pled in “‘general terms.’”93   
Furthermore, in Charleswell v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 
N.A.,94 the court upheld an affirmative defense, which only 
alleged that “Plaintiffs’ claims are barred in whole or in part by 
Plaintiffs’ contributory and/or comparative negligence.”95  As in 
McLemore, the court reasoned that Twombly was interpreting 
the word “showing” in Rule 8(a), and under Rule 8(c) the 
defendant does not have to “show” anything.96  Thus, the 
plausibility standard does not apply to a defendant’s affirmative 
defenses pled under Rule 8(c).97 
A number of courts were troubled by the inherent unfairness 
in requiring a defendant to plead enough facts to prove an 
affirmative defense plausible on its face.98  Specifically, in 
Holdbrook v. SAIA Motor Freight Line, L.L.C.,99 the court upheld 
an affirmative defense which merely alleged: “Plaintiff has been 
the cause of his own damages . . . .”100  The court reasoned that 
affirmative defenses are not held to a heightened pleading 
standard as it is entirely reasonable to hold a plaintiff who may 
 
 92 Id.  This decision is focusing not on the underlying policies of the Twombly and 
Iqbal decisions, but rather on a simple textual analysis of the Rules.  Strictly speaking, 
the court is correct in this regard as the text of Rule 8(a) and 8(c) clearly differ. Compare 
FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) (“A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain . . . a short 
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .”), with 
FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c)(1) (“In responding to a pleading, a party must affirmatively state any 
avoidance or affirmative defense.” (emphasis added)).  In applying the same pre-Twombly 
standard to affirmative defenses though, the court is taking an approach inconsistent 
with the new direction of the Supreme Court.  As will be discussed further below, this 
Comment’s proposed standard takes into account the textual differences between Rule 
8(a) and 8(c), as well as the underlying policies of the Twombly and Iqbal decisions.  In so 
doing, the correct medium is attained, and the concerns of these district court decisions 
and those of the Twombly and Iqbal decisions are effectively harmonized. 
 93 McLemore, 2010 WL 1010092, at *13 (quoting Lawrence v. Chabot, 182 F. App’x 
442, 456 (6th Cir. 2006), aff’d sub nom. Lawrence v. Welch, 531 F.3d 364 (6th Cir. 2008)). 
 94 Charleswell v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A, No. 01-119, 2009 WL 4981730, at *4 
(D. Va. Dec. 8, 2009). 
 95 Id. at *6. 
 96 Id. at *4.  Similarly, in Henson v. Supplemental Health Care Staffing Specialists, 
the court upheld an affirmative defense which only alleged: “[t]he doctrines of waiver 
and/or estoppel preclude the Plaintiff’s right to recover in whole or in part.” No. CIV-09-
0397-HE, 2009 U.S. Dist LEXIS 127642, at *2 (W.D. Okla. July 30, 2009).  When the 
complaint and the defense are examined together, the defense provides the plaintiff with 
enough to be informed “of the nature of the defense . . . .” Id. at *4. 
 97 Chase Manhattan Bank, 2009 WL 4981730, at *4.  See also Romantine v. CH2M 
Hill Eng’rs, Inc., No. 09-973, 2009 WL 3417469, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 23, 2009) (“This court 
does not believe that Twombly is appropriately applied to either affirmative defenses 
under 8(c), or general defenses under Rule 8(b) . . . .”). 
 98 See infra notes 99–101 and accompanying text. 
 99 Holdbrook v. SAIA Motor Freight Line, L.L.C., No. 09-cv-02870-LTB-BNB, 2010 
WL 865380 (D. Colo. Mar. 8, 2010). 
 100 Id. at *1. 
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have years to investigate his or her claims to a higher standard 
than a defendant who has only twenty-one days to respond to the 
complaint.101 
Thus, these decisions explicitly rejected the policy rationales 
underlying the Twombly and Iqbal decisions.102  Instead, they 
focused on the textual differences between Rule 8(a) and 8(c), as 
well as fairness concerns, and held that the plausibility standard 
is not applicable to affirmative defenses.103 
 
 101 Id. at *2.  Consider also, the court in Baum v. Faith Technologies, which held that 
it is unfair to “expect defendants to be aware of all the necessary facts” required to make 
up an affirmative defense, as the defendant has not yet had an opportunity to conduct 
discovery. No.10-CV-0144-CVE-TLW, 2010 WL 2365451, at *3 (N.D. Okla. June 9, 2010).  
Besides, when taken together, a complaint and an answer provide a plaintiff with 
sufficient notice of the defense. Id.  Thus, a court should look at both the answer and the 
complaint because “[i]t would be absurd to require a defendant to re-plead every fact 
relevant to an affirmative defense.” Id. 
 102 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 
U.S. 544, 559 (2007). 
 103 Thus, at least to these decisions, Conley is not entirely irrelevant as a pleading 
standard; rather, it only applies to an affirmative defense.  Therefore, Conley is truly not 
“bad law” as these decisions are clearly adopting this standard.  If Conley is to somehow 
remain applicable after the Twombly and Iqbal decisions, it would most likely have to be 
through an affirmative defense.  For additional decisions which reject the plausibility 
standard, see Bowers v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, No. 10–4141–JTM–
DJW, 2011 WL 2149423, at *4 (D. Kan. June 1, 2011) (holding that affirmative defenses 
“are not subject to the rationale and holdings of Iqbal and Twombly.”);; Schlief v. Nu-
Source, Inc., No. 10-4477 (DWF/SER), 2011 WL 1560672, at *9 (D. Minn. Apr. 25, 2011) 
(“The Court concludes that the pleading standard set forth in Twombly and Iqbal does not 
apply to affirmative defenses.”);; Falley v. Friends University, No. 10-1423-CM, 2011 WL 
1429956, at *4 (D. Kan. Apr. 14, 2011) (“[T]he pleading standards of Twombly and Iqbal 
should be limited to complaints—not extended to affirmative defenses.”);; Tyco Fire 
Products LP v. Victaulic Co., No.10-4645, 2011 WL 1399847, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 12, 2011) 
(“Twombly and Iqbal do not apply to affirmative defenses.”);; In re Washington Mutual, 
Inc. Securities, Derivative & ERISA Litigation, No. 08-md-1919 MJP, 2011 WL 1158387, 
at *1 (W.D. Wa. Mar. 25, 2011) (holding Twombly and Iqbal do not apply to affirmative 
defenses);; Jeeper’s of Auburn, Inc. v. KWJB Enterprise, L.L.C., No. 10-13682, 2011 WL 
1899195, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 16, 2011) (holding that since Iqbal and Twombly do not 
expressly apply to affirmative defenses, then they should not be extended as such); Sewell 
v. Allied Interstate, Inc., No. 3:10-CV-113, 2011 WL 32209, at *7 (E.D. Tenn. Jan. 5, 2011) 
(holding that since Twombly and Iqbal do not expressly apply to affirmative defenses, 
then they should not be extended as such); Ameristar Fence Products., Inc. v. Phoenix 
Fence Co., No.CV-10-299-PHX-DGC, 2010 WL 2803907, at *1 (D. Ariz. July 15, 2010) 
(“[T]he pleading standards enunciated in Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal . . . have no 
application to affirmative defenses pled under Rule 8(c).”);; Jackson v. City of Centreville, 
269 F.R.D. 661, 662 (N.D. Ala. 2010) (“The Supreme Court desired to prevent plaintiffs 
with groundless claims from wasting judicial and other legal resources . . . .  Neither 
Twombly nor Iqbal address Rules 8(b)(1)(A) and 8(c) which pertain to affirmative 
defenses.” (citations omitted));; First National Insurance Co. of America v. Camps 
Services, Ltd., No.08-cv-12805, 2009 U.S. Dist LEXIS 149, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 5, 2009) 
(“Twombly’s analysis of the ‘short and plain statement’ requirement of Rule 8(a) is 
inapplicable to this motion under Rule 8(c).”);; Westbrook v. Paragon Systems, Inc., No. 07-
0714-WS-C, 2007 U.S. Dist LEXIS 88490, at *2 (S.D. Ala. Nov. 29, 2007) (“Twombly was 
decided under Rule 8(a), . . . and plaintiff has identified no case extending it to Rule 8(b) 
or (c).” (citation omitted)).  In addition to the above, a number of decisions implicitly 
rejected Twombly’s and Iqbal’s pleading requirements.  See Chatelaine, Inc. v. Twin 
Modal, Inc., No. 3:10-CV-676, 2010 U.S. Dist LEXIS 89348, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 27, 
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C. District Courts That Do Not Explicitly Adopt or Reject 
Twombly and Iqbal Are Applying Standards Inconsistent with 
Those Decisions 
A number of district courts have explicitly neglected to 
decide the Twombly and Iqbal issue, but rather simply adopt a 
different standard or revert to Conley’s notice standard.  Thus, 
these decisions, although not explicit, are rejecting the Twombly 
and Iqbal rule as they are applying standards inconsistent with 
the plausibility test. 
i.  District Courts That Apply a Notice Pleading Standard 
These decisions simply cite Twombly or Iqbal and then 
conclude that the proper standard is one of only providing the 
plaintiff with “fair notice” of the defense, not of providing the 
plaintiff with any factual basis for the defense.104 
In BJ Energy, L.L.C. v. PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.,105 the 
court declined to strike an affirmative defense which simply 
stated: “[Plaintiff] has failed to mitigate any damages it purports 
to have suffered.”106  Despite failing to allege any factual basis for 
why or how the plaintiff failed to mitigate damages, “fair notice 
of the nature of the defense” is all that is required as the 
discovery process, not the pleadings, are the proper mechanism 
in which to uncover the factual basis for the defenses.107  This is 
 
2010) (holding affirmative defenses were sufficiently pled and that “any facts supporting 
these [affirmative defenses] can and should be fleshed out through discovery”);; Pezzuto v. 
Premier Hosp. Mgmt., Inc., No. 10-CV-068-JHP, 2010 WL 2788163, at *1 (E.D. Okla. July 
14, 2010) (holding that affirmative defenses should be read in conjunction with the 
complaint because “an answer . . . will contain fewer factual assertions than a complaint 
and still be sufficient”);; Kaufmann v. Prudential Ins. Co., No.09-10239-RGS, 2009 WL 
2449872, at *1 n.1 (D. Ma. Aug. 6, 2009) (holding that Rule 8(c)(1) defenses need only be 
pled as listed because the “plaintiff, as the instigator of the litigation, has the initial good 
faith burden to investigate and verify the validity of her claims”). 
 104 See, e.g., Local 165 v. DEM/EX Grp. Inc., No. 09-1356, 2010 WL 971811, at *2 
(C.D. Ill. Mar. 11, 2010) (“[T]here must be enough to give the opposing party notice of the 
basis for the claim or defense.” (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 
(2007))). 
 105 BJ Energy, L.L.C. v. PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., Nos. 08-3649, 09-2864, 2010 
WL 1491900 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 13, 2010). 
 106 Id. at *4. 
 107 Id. at *2, *5.  A true Twombly and Iqbal analysis would most certainly have struck 
this.  For starters, there are literally no factual allegations in the defense. See Iqbal, 129 
S. Ct. at 1949 (“[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 
‘state claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” (emphasis added) (quoting Bell Atl. 
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007))).  A plaintiff trying to focus the scope of 
discovery would have to broadly determine the defendant’s reasons, if any, for asserting 
the defense.  This would require ascertaining what the defendant thinks, which 
necessarily can be a wide range of topics. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., From Whom No 
Secrets Are Hid, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1665, 1685 (1998) (“Since discovery extends under Rule 26 
to anything ‘relevant to the subject matter,’ relevance must be ascertained by some other 
mechanism.  The only effective alternative is discovery itself.”).  This will only protract 
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clearly antithetical to Twombly’s and Iqbal’s intentions of 
denying a party access to discovery by merely pleading legal 
conclusions, which may provide notice of the claim, but are 
devoid of any factual basis.108  Thus, this decision and others 
cited, revert to notice pleading, a much lower bar for a defendant 
to surpass, which accomplishes little in reducing the costs of 
discovery.109 
 
litigation and add to its costs. See Andrew P. Morriss & Jason Korosec, Private Dispute 
Resolution in the Card Context: Structure, Reputation, and Incentives, 1 J.L. ECON. & 
POL’Y 393, 403 (2005) (explaining that under a notice pleading regime limitations on the 
parties’ abilities to conduct lengthy discovery is not very limited as the parties must 
attempt to determine what can be relevant to the vaguely stated claim or defense); Ettie 
Ward, Will the Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Improve the 
Pretrial Process?, 72 N.Y. ST. B.A. J. 18, 24 (2000) (discussing the effect of depositions on 
discovery costs); Michael G. Dailey, Comment, Preemption of State Court Class Action 
Claims for Securities Fraud: Should Federal Law Trump?, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 587, 595 
(1998–1999) (explaining how the expensive costs of discovery can cause a defendant to 
settle instead of attempting to bear these costs). 
 108 See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950 (“Rule 8 . . . does not unlock the doors of discovery for 
a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions.”);; Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 
U.S. 544, 559 (2007) (“[T]he threat of discovery expense will push cost-conscious 
defendants to settle even anemic cases before even reaching [pretrial] proceedings.”).  For 
the remaining decisions which apply this standard, see Local 165 v. DEM/EX Grp. Inc., 
No. 09-1356, 2010 WL 971811, at *2 (C.D. Ill. Mar. 11, 2010) (“[T]here must be enough to 
give the opposing party notice of the basis for the claim or defense.” (citing Twombly, 550 
U.S. at 555)); Tara Prods., Inc. v. Hollywood Gadgets, Inc., No. 09-61436-CIV-
COHN/SELTZER, 2009 U.S. Dist LEXIS 121709, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 11, 2009) 
(“Although Rule 8 does not obligate a defendant to set forth detailed factual allegations, a 
defendant must give the plaintiff ‘fair notice’ of the nature of the defense and the grounds 
upon which it rests.”);; Darnell v. Hoelscher, Inc., No. 09-204-JPG, 2009 WL 4675884, at 
*1 (S.D. Ill. Dec. 4, 2009) (“[T]he [defense] need only give fair notice of what the claim is 
and the grounds upon which it rests.” (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555)); CTF Dev., Inc. 
v. Penta Hospitality, L.L.C., No. C 09-02429 WHA, 2009 WL 3517617, at *8 (N.D. Cal. 
Oct. 26, 2009) (holding that Iqbal only requires the defendant to provide the plaintiff with 
“fair notice” of the affirmative defense);; FDIC v. Bristol Home Mortg. Lending, L.L.C., No. 
08-81536-CIV, 2009 WL 2488302, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 13, 2009) (“Although Rule 8 does 
not obligate a defendant to set forth detailed factual allegations, a defendant must give 
the plaintiff ‘fair notice’ of the nature of the defense and the grounds upon which it 
rests.”);; New York v. Micron Tech., Inc., No. C 06-6436, 2009 U.S. Dist LEXIS 1624, at 
*12 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2009) (“The ‘fair notice’ pleading requirement is met if the 
defendant ‘sufficiently articulated the defense so that the plaintiff was not a victim of 
unfair surprise.’” (quoting Woodfield v. Bowman, 193 F.3d 354, 362 (5th Cir. 1999))); 
Greenheck Fan Corp. v. Loren Cook Co., No. 08-cv-335-jps, 2008 WL 4443805, at *1 (W.D. 
Wis. Sept. 25, 2008) (“The issue is . . . whether [the] plaintiff has been placed on notice of 
defendant’s grounds for raising the defense.”). 
 109 See Edward H. Cooper, Simplified Rules of Federal Procedure?, 100 MICH. L. REV. 
1794, 1804 (2002) (discussing how discovery under notice pleading “can entail pretrial 
practice out of any sensible relationship to the stakes or needs of relatively simple 
litigation”);; Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 635, 639 (1989) 
(describing how notice pleading often entails discovery costs which are ultimately 
irrelevant to the merits of the case); Michael F. Urbanski & James R. Creekmore, 
Antitrust and Trade Regulation Law, 32 U. RICH. L. REV. 973, 986 (1998) (discussing how 
discovery under a notice regime “can often be extensive, expensive and burdensome” 
(quoting DEE-K Enterprises, Inc. v. Heveafil Sdn. Bhd., 982 F. Supp. 1138, 1150 (E.D. Va. 
1997)). 
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ii.  District Courts That Require an Adequate Factual Basis 
or Factual Particularity to Be Pled Are Not Adopting the 
Plausibility Standard 
These decisions were fractured from Part III(A) because the 
cases in this category do not apply both the factual and 
plausibility elements of the Twombly and Iqbal decisions.110  
Rather, these cases require facts to be pled, but not necessarily 
enough to give rise to a defense “that is plausible on its face.”111  
Notably, in Holtzman v. B/E Aerospace, Inc.,112 the court held 
that nine of the defendant’s seventeen affirmative defenses pled 
“insufficient allegations of fact.”113  Citing Twombly, the court 
reasoned that factual support must be pled in an affirmative 
defense because a plaintiff should not simply have to guess as to 
what the basis is for the defendant’s assertions.114  However, the 
court stopped short of requiring the defense to be plausible, but 
rather only required that factual support be provided.115 
Thus, this decision and others cited were not assessing the 
sufficiency of factual support provided under a plausibility 
standard, but were simply assessing whether or not any facts 
were pled.116 
 
 110 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (“[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.’” (quoting 
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570)). 
 111 Id.  See also infra notes 112–12 and accompanying text. 
 112 Holtzman v. B/E Aerospace, Inc, No. 07-80551-CIV, 2008 WL 2225668 (S.D. Fla. 
May 29, 2008). 
 113 Id. at *2. 
 114 Id. (quoting Stoner v. Walsh, 772 F. Supp. 790, 800 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)). 
 115 Id. 
 116 Therefore, this did not encompass the two part plausibility requirement, but 
rather only required some factual basis. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 
(2009).  For the remaining decisions applying this standard, see Luvata Buffalo, Inc. v. 
Lombard General Insurance Co. of Canada, No. 08-CV-00034(A)(M), 2010 WL 826583, at 
*8 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 2010) (“Affirmative defenses which amount to nothing more than 
mere conclusions of law and are not warranted by any asserted facts have no efficacy.” 
(quoting Shechter v. Comptroller of N.Y.C., 79 F.3d 265, 270 (2d Cir. 1996))); Cosmetic 
Warriors, Ltd. v. Lush Boutique, L.L.C., No. 09-6381, 2010 U.S. Dist LEXIS 16392, at *4 
(E.D. La. Feb. 1, 2010) (“[A] defendant must plead an affirmative defense with . . . factual 
particularity.”);; IndyMac Venture, L.L.C. v. Silver Creek Crossing, L.L.C., C09-1069Z, 
2010 U.S. Dist LEXIS 34275, at *11 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 18, 2010) (“Courts have stricken 
defenses that were unsupported by facts entitling defendants to relief . . . and when 
defenses rely on facts that, even if true, would not provide a valid defense to the claims 
asserted” (citations omitted));; EEOC v. Hibbing Taconite Co., 266 F.R.D 260, 268 (D. 
Minn. 2009) (“[T]he defendant [must] plead an adequate factual basis for affirmative 
defenses, where the basis is not apparent by the defense’s bare assertion.”);; Solis v. Zenith 
Capital, L.L.C., No. C 08-4854 PJH, 2009 U.S. Dist LEXIS 43350, at *6 (N.D. Cal. May 8, 
2009) (“Where an affirmative defense simply states a legal conclusion or theory without 
the support of facts explaining how it connects to the instant case, it is insufficient and 
will not withstand a motion to strike.”);; Stoffels v. SBC Communications, No. 05-CV-0233-
WWJ, 2008 WL 4391396, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 22, 2008) (holding that affirmative 
defenses must “provide the grounds for entitlement to relief and requires ‘more than 
labels and conclusions’” and must be pled with “factual particularity” (quoting Bell Atl. 
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iii.  One District Court Applied Both the Plausibility 
Standard and the Fair Notice Standard to Affirmative 
Defenses 
The parties in Voeks v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,117 debated over 
whether the Twombly standard should apply or if the fair notice 
standard outlined in Woodfield v. Bowman should apply.118  The 
court held that in fact both should apply because “Twombly and 
Woodfield are not materially different.”119  The proper test is not 
that “specific facts are [] necessary; [but, that] the statement 
need only ‘give . . . fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the 
grounds upon which it rests.”120  The amount and specificity of 
facts which are required to be pled turn on the defense pled, and 
the specific case in which it is pled.121  Although this decision was 
not adopting a plausibility standard,122 it did require the answer 
at least to provide the grounds on which the defense rests, which 
may include certain facts depending on the particular defense 
pled.123 
 
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007))); Home Mgmt. Solutions, Inc. v. Prescient, 
Inc., No. 07-20608-CIV, 2007 WL 2412834, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 21, 2007) (holding that 
because “a defendant must . . . plead an affirmative defense with enough specificity or 
factual support to give the plaintiff ‘fair notice’ of the defense,” by failing to plead the 
elements of the defense or any facts to support those elements, the defendant failed to 
provide the plaintiff with fair notice). 
 117 Voeks v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 07-C-0030, 2008 WL 89434 (E.D. Wis. Jan. 7, 
2008). 
 118 Woodfield v. Bowman, 193 F.3d 354, 362 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding  that a defendant 
“must plead an affirmative defense with enough specificity or factual particularity to give 
the plaintiff ‘fair notice’ of the defense that is being advanced”).   
 119 Voeks, 2008 WL 89434, at *6. 
 120 Id. (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 
355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957), abrogated by Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007))). 
 121 Id. The court upheld a statute of limitations defense because although “not pled 
with much detail,” it is essentially “self-explanatory.” Id. 
 122 Id. (“Twombly and Woodfield are not materially different”).  The court also 
required the elements of equitable defenses to be pled. Id.  Other courts take a similar 
approach to equitable defenses. See, e.g., Bartashnik v. Bridgeview Bancorp, Inc., No. 05 
C 2731, 2005 WL 3470315, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 15, 2005) (“[E]quitable defenses . . . must 
be pled with the specific elements required to establish the defense.” (quoting Yash Raj 
Films Inc. v. Atl. Video, No. 03 C 7069, 2004 WL 1200184, at *3 (N.D. Ill. May 28, 2004))). 
 123 Voeks, 2008 WL 89434, at *6.  There were also a number of decisions that applied 
a “cannot succeed under any circumstances test.” See United States v. The Boeing Co., No. 
05-1073-WEB, 2009 U.S. Dist LEXIS 71625, at *8 (D. Kan. Aug. 13, 2009) (“A defense is 
considered insufficient if it cannot succeed, as a matter of law, under any 
circumstances.”);; Champion Bank v. Reg’l Dev., L.L.C., No. 4:08CV1807 CDP, 2009 WL 
1351122, at *4 (E.D. Mo. May 13, 2009) (Motions to strike “should not be granted ‘unless 
as a matter of law, the defense cannot succeed under any circumstances’” (quoting FDIC 
v. Coble, 720 F. Supp. 748, 750 (E.D. Mo. 1989))); Wilhelm v. TLC Lawn Care, Inc., No. 
07-2465-KHV, 2008 U.S. Dist LEXIS 13221, at *4 (D. Kan. Feb. 19, 2008) (“A defense is 
insufficient if it cannot succeed, as a matter of law, under any circumstances.”);; Robertson 
v. LTS Mgmt. Servs. L.L.C., 642 F. Supp. 2d 922, 933 (W.D. Mo. 2008) (“[T]he Court is 
unable to state definitely that this defense could not succeed under any circumstances.”);; 
Mark v. Gov’t Props. Trust, Inc., No. 8:06CV769, 2007 WL 1319712, at *3 (D. Neb. Apr. 5, 
2007) (holding that a court “must be convinced . . . that under no set of circumstances can 
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D. Summary of the Current State of the Affirmative Defense 
Overall, the Twombly and Iqbal standard has not been 
uniformly applied to affirmative defenses, and the majority of 
courts dealing with the issue have not applied the plausibility 
standard.124  Some may explicitly adopt or reject the standard, 
while many simply dodge the issue and apply a different 
standard.125  As the current state of the affirmative defense is 
marred with a multitude of varying rules and rationales, the true 
question becomes: What standard should ultimately be adopted?  
In order to answer this question properly, a reconciliation must 
be had between the Twombly and Iqbal decisions, the textual 
language of the Rules, and the practical implications of adopting 
a certain standard. 
IV.  ADOPTING THE PROPER STANDARD REQUIRES STRIKING THE 
APPROPRIATE BALANCE BETWEEN THE TWOMBLY AND IQBAL 
DECISIONS, THE TEXT OF THE RULES, AND FAIRNESS CONCERNS TO 
A DEFENDANT AND PLAINTIFF 
To reiterate, when ruling on how properly to assess an 
affirmative defense, district courts today are essentially left with 
three standards: (1) apply the Twombly and Iqbal plausibility 
 
the defense succeed” (quoting Puckett v. United States, 82 F. Supp. 2d 660, 663 (S.D. Tex. 
1999))).  This standard is clearly inconsistent with the Twombly and Iqbal plausibility 
standard, as allowing a defense to survive a motion to strike simply because it can 
succeed under some conceivable circumstance certainly does not mean that the defense is 
necessarily plausible. 
 124 In addition to the above categories, a number of decisions assumed, but did not 
hold, that Twombly or Iqbal did or did not apply. See Ahle v. Veracity Research Co., 738 
F. Supp. 2d 896, 925 (D. Minn. 2010) (“Even if the heightened pleading standards are not 
applicable to affirmative defenses, Plaintiffs have not been given adequate notice [of the 
affirmative defense].”);; Lapic v. MTD Prods., Inc., No. 09-760, 2009 WL 3030305, at *3 
(W.D. Pa. Sept. 17, 2009) (“[E]ven if the new standards of Twombly apply to affirmative 
defenses, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that Defendant’s affirmative defenses fail to give 
him ‘fair notice’ of the nature of the defenses . . . .”). 
 125 This conclusion differs from that of other commentators and courts that have 
concluded that the majority of courts actually do adopt the plausibility standard. See 
Barnes v. AT&T Pension Benefit Plan-Nonbargained Program, 718 F. Supp. 2d 1167, 
1171 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (holding that most courts “have extended Twombly’s heightened 
pleading standard to affirmative defenses”);; Dominguez et al., supra note 51, at 77 (“The 
vast majority of district courts that have considered the issue . . . hold that Twombly’s 
plausibility standard applies to [the pleading of] affirmative defenses”);; Mize, supra note 
51, at 1260 (arguing that the majority of courts have applied the plausibility standard to 
affirmative defenses).  This Comment’s conclusion is based upon the fact that only the 
decisions discussed and cited in Part III(A) apply the two part plausibility test.  It is not 
enough that a decision simply cites Twombly or Iqbal, but then goes on to apply a 
different standard.  The plausibility standard is a two part standard requiring facts and a 
plausible defense. See supra notes 48–50 and accompanying text.  Anything less is not a 
true Twombly and Iqbal analysis.  Thus, this Comment concludes that based on the 
totality of the decisions not listed in Part III(A), the majority of district courts are not 
actually applying the Twombly and Iqbal standard to affirmative defenses. 
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standard;126 (2) apply the Conley notice pleading standard;127 or 
(3) apply the adequate factual basis standard.128  This Comment 
proposes that the proper standard to be applied to an affirmative 
defense is one that requires “the defendant to plead an adequate 
factual basis for [his or her] affirmative defense[].”129  This would 
not assess the plausibility of the defense, but only whether there 
is a factual basis for the defense.130 
One may argue that such a standard is inconsistent with the 
Supreme Court’s decision of Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, N.A.,131 
where the Court held that Rule 8’s notice pleading standard is 
“inextricably linked” amongst the Rules.132  However, even if 
Swierkiewicz is the Court’s newest “notice pleading decision,” 
Twombly and Iqbal are the Court’s only plausibility pleading 
decisions.133  The Twombly and Iqbal decisions explicitly 
overruled Conley’s notice pleading standard134 and in so doing, 
broke any link a notice pleading regime may have had between 
Rule 8 and the other Rules.135  Thus, to argue that Swierkiewicz 
 
 126 See supra Part III(A). 
 127 This encompasses those courts that explicitly rejected the plausibility standard 
and applied a notice standard and those which did not explicitly reject the plausibility 
standard, but applied a notice standard regardless. See supra Parts III(B)–(C)(i). 
 128 See supra Part III(C)(ii).  To a lesser extent, this would encompass Voeks v. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc, as that decision required factual particularity to the extent the 
particular case and defense called for it. 2008 WL 89434, at *6. 
 129 Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Hibbing Taconite Co., 266 F.R.D 260, 268 (D. 
Minn. 2009).   
 130 A fact-pleading standard would not assess the ability of the pleader to prove the 
defense pled. See, e.g., 49A WILLIAM LINDSLEY, J.D. ET AL., CALIFORNIA JURISPRUDENCE 
3D PLEADING § 77 (2010) (“A [pleader] need only plead facts showing that he or she may be 
entitled to some relief;; a court is not concerned with the [pleader’s] possible inability or 
difficulty in proving the allegations of the [pleading].”).  Rather, a standard requiring 
facts to be pled, as this Comment’s proposed standard would, only focuses on the 
defendant’s ability to plead a factual basis for the affirmative defense.  This does not 
require the reviewing judge to assess the plausibility of the defense, but it would still 
require the defendant to comply with Rule 11, and thus, the defendant could not simply 
conjure up some factual basis, which in reality never had any relevance to the defense. 
See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(3) (“By presenting to the court a pleading, written motion, or 
other paper . . . an attorney or unrepresented party certifies that to the best of the 
person’s knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the 
circumstances: . . . the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so 
identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further 
investigation or discovery . . . .”). 
 131 Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002). 
 132 Id. at 513. 
 133 See Scozzaro, supra note 28, at 429–30 (“Where Conley addressed the pleading 
issue as an aside, Swierkiewicz took it head on and met it in the ‘center ring.’  . . . 
Swierkiewicz will supplant Conley as ‘the’ notice pleading decision.”).  See also supra Part 
II (discussing Twombly’s and Iqbal’s plausibility standard). 
 134 See infra notes 143–46 and accompanying text (noting that Twombly and Iqbal 
only interpreted Rule 8(a)). 
 135 See Suja A. Thomas, The New Summary Judgment Motion: The Motion to Dismiss 
Under Iqbal and Twombly, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 15, 36 (2010) (noting that although 
not explicit, the Twombly and Iqbal decisions essentially overruled Swierkiewicz). 
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is anything more than a reminder that Conley was the proper 
standard for a complaint is to overlook the Twombly and Iqbal 
decisions’ language and purpose.136  When Iqbal explicitly 
announced that “Rule 8 . . . does not unlock the doors of discovery 
for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions,” it not 
only defeated Swierkiewicz’s notice mandate, but it announced 
that the plaintiff and defendant are not inextricably linked to the 
same pleading standard.137 
Thus, in light of Twombly and Iqbal, the issue becomes 
whether affirmative defenses should remain untouched or if a 
change is necessary.  This Comment’s proposed adequate factual 
basis standard is the proper solution to this issue due to: (1) the 
textual language of Rule 8; (2) the policies expressed in Twombly 
and Iqbal; and (3) overall fairness concerns to not only the 
defendant, but the plaintiff as well. 
A. Rule 8 Does Not Set Forth the Same Standard for 
Complaints and Affirmative Defenses 
Based on a simple textual reading of Rule 8(c) and Rule 8(a), 
it is clear that the rules do not set forth identical standards for 
affirmative defenses and complaints.138  According to Rule 8(c) 
the defendant need only “affirmatively state any avoidance or 
affirmative defense.”139  In contrast, Rule 8(a)(2) provides that a 
 
 136 See Michael R. Huston, Note, Pleading With Congress to Resist the Urge to 
Overrule Twombly and Iqbal, 109 MICH. L. REV. 415, 437 (2010) (discussing why Twombly 
and Iqbal show that the Court’s attention has now turned to addressing “the costs and 
burdens of discovery in modern federal litigation”). 
 137 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009) (emphasis added).  In so holding, 
the Court was making it clear that its focus was now on controlling discovery, not 
allowing discovery. See Sybil Dunlop & Elizabeth Cowan Wright, Plausible Deniability: 
How the Supreme Court Created a Heightened Pleading Standard Without Admitting 
They Did So, 33 HAMLINE L. REV. 205, 241 (2010) (noting that the Twombly and Iqbal 
decisions display that the Court has now recognized that the costs of discovery may force 
parties to settle).  This is clearly a break from the Swierkiewicz and Conley Court’s 
rationale and focus on “liberal discovery.” Thomas, supra note 135 at 36 (explaining that 
the Iqbal Court’s focus on controlling the scope and costs of discovery is clearly 
inconsistent with the Swierkiewicz Court’s emphasis on “liberal discovery” (quoting 
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002))). See also infra notes 143–46 and 
accompanying text (discussing how Twombly and Iqbal were only meant to apply to 
complaints). 
 138 See, e.g., FTC v. Hope Now Modifications, No. 09-1204, 2011 WL 883202, at *3 (D. 
N.J. Mar. 10, 2011) (“[T]he Federal Rules of Civil Procedure distinguish the level of 
pleading required between a plaintiff asserting a claim for relief under Rule 8(a) and a 
defendant asserting an affirmative defense under Rule 8(c).”);; McLemore v. Regions Bank, 
Nos. 3:08-cv-0021, 3:08-cv-1003, 2010 WL 1010092, at *13 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 18, 2010) 
(noting that although Rule 8(b) and Rule 8(a) both require an answer or a complaint, 
respectively, to be stated “‘in short and plain terms’ . . . .  ‘Rule 8(b) does not apply when a 
defendant asserts an affirmative defense.”);; First Nat’l Ins. Co. of Am. v. Camps Servs., 
LTD, No. 08-cv-12805, 2009 U.S. Dist LEXIS 149, at *4–5 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 5, 2009) 
(holding that Twombly was interpreting Rule 8(a), not 8(c)). 
 139 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c) (emphasis added). 
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complaint “must contain . . . a short and plain statement of the 
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”140  Thus, a 
defendant must only “affirmatively state”141 an affirmative 
defense, while a plaintiff must “show” that he or she “is entitled 
to relief.”142  The Rules necessarily require less of a defendant 
pleading an affirmative defense than of a plaintiff pleading a 
claim for relief.  Most instructive of this lack of commonality is 
that nowhere in Twombly or Iqbal does the Court mention either 
answers or affirmative defenses.143  To be precise, Iqbal is strewn 
with language, which, at a bare minimum, heavily implies that it 
was only meant to apply to complaints: 
Where a complaint pleads facts that are “merely consistent with” a 
defendant’s liability, it “stops short of the line between possibility and 
plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief . . . .’” 
. . . . 
[T]he tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations 
contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions . . . .  
[O]nly a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives . . . .  
Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief 
will . . . be a context-specific task . . . .  But where the well-pleaded 
facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of 
misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not “shown”[144]—
”that the pleader is entitled to relief.”145 
 
 140 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). 
 141 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c). 
 142 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). 
 143 A number of district courts explicitly recognized this lack of language in Twombly 
and Iqbal. Ameristar Fence Prods., Inc. v. Phoenix Fence Co., No. CV-10-299-PHX-DGC, 
2010 WL 2803907, at *1 (D. Ariz. July 15, 2010) (“[T]he pleading standards enunciated in 
Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal . . . have no application to affirmative defenses pled under 
Rule 8(c).”);; McLemore v. Regions Bank, Nos. 3:08-cv-0021, 3:08-cv-1003, 2010 WL 
1010092, at *13 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 18, 2010) (“[Twombly] does not mention affirmative 
defenses or any other subsection of Rule 8.  Iqbal also focused exclusively on the pleading 
burden that applies to plaintiffs’ complaints.”).  The Court was not interpreting what a 
defendant must affirmatively state under Rule 8(c), but rather was only interpreting the 
word “showing” which exclusively appears in Rule 8(a) governing complaints. See Kevin 
M. Clermont, Three Myths About Twombly-Iqbal, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1337, 1359 
(2010).  Thus, as Iqbal held that only “a complaint” must be plausible, the Court was 
making it clear that it was only assessing the pleading requirements for complaints. 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (emphasis added).  See also Roger M. 
Michalski, Assessing Iqbal, HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. ONLINE (Dec. 8, 2010), 
http://hlpronline.com/2010/12/assessing-iqbal/ (discussing how Twombly and Iqbal  
are only concerned with Rule 8(a)); Sean Warjert, Does the Twombly-Iqbal Pleading  
Standard Apply to Defenses Too?, MASSTORTDEFENSE (Jan. 12, 2010), 
http://www.masstortdefense.com/2010/01/articles/does-the-twomblyiqbal-pleading-
standard-apply-to-defenses-too/ (“The Supreme Court addressed in Twombly the 
requirements for a well-pled complaint under Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)’s ‘short and plain 
statement’ requirement.  No such language, however, appears within Rule 8(c), the 
applicable rule for affirmative defenses.  As such, Twombly’s analysis of the ‘short and 
plain statement’ requirement of Rule 8(a) is inapplicable to a motion under Rule 8(c).” 
(quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a))). 
 144 Recall that Rule 8(a)(2) requires that “[a] pleading that states a claim for relief 
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Furthermore, consider the language used in Twombly to 
expound its holding: 
[S]tating such a claim requires a complaint with enough factual 
matter . . . to suggest that an agreement was made . . . .  And, of 
course, a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a 
savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable . . . . 
. . . . 
The need . . . for allegations plausibly suggesting . . . agreement 
reflects the threshold requirement of Rule 8(a)(2) that the “plain 
statement” possess enough heft to “sho[w] that the pleader is entitled to 
relief.”[146] . . .  An allegation of parallel conduct is thus much like a 
naked assertion of conspiracy in a § 1 complaint: it gets the complaint 
close to stating a claim, but without some further factual 
enhancement it stops short of the line between possibility and 
plausibility of “entitle[ment] to relief.”147 
Contrast this language with that of Conley, which is much 
more susceptible to a universal pleading interpretation:148 
Such simplified “notice pleading” is made possible by the liberal 
opportunity for discovery and the other pretrial procedures 
 
must contain . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 
entitled to relief . . . .” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added).  However, Rule 8(c)(1) 
requires only that “a party . . . affirmatively state any avoidance or affirmative 
defense . . . .” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c)(1) (emphasis added). 
 145 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949–50 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quoting Bell 
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (quoting Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 
157–58 (2d Cir. 2007), rev’d sub nom. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009))).  
Furthermore, during oral arguments, the Court was exclusively discussing whether the 
Twombly standard applies outside the context of an antitrust claim. See Oral Argument, 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009), No. 07-1015, 2008 WL 5168391, at *21 (at oral 
arguments in Iqbal, Justice Stevens noted that if the Court in Twombly felt the claim was 
not plausible, then “this claim is implausible because it’s got exactly the same 
problems . . . .  It seems to me these cases are very similar” (emphasis added)). 
 146 See supra note 144 (noting the similarity of language used by the Court and Rule 
8(a)). 
 147 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556–57 (2007) (emphasis added) 
(quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)). 
Additionally, Twombly went to extra bounds to only overrule that part of Conley which 
applies to complaints: 
We could go on, but there is no need to pile up further citations to show that 
Conley’s “no set of facts” language has been questioned, criticized, and 
explained away long enough.  To be fair to the Conley Court, the passage 
should be understood in light of the opinion’s preceding summary of the 
complaint’s concrete allegations, which the Court quite reasonably understood 
as amply stating a claim for relief . . . .  The phrase is best forgotten as an 
incomplete, negative gloss on an accepted pleading standard: once a claim has 
been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts 
consistent with the allegations in the complaint. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 562–63 (emphasis added). 
 148 See Wyshak v. City Nat’l Bank, 607 F.2d 824, 827 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding that 
affirmative defenses, like complaints, are subject to Conley’s fair notice standard (citing 
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47–48 (1957), abrogated by Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 
U.S. 544 (2007))).   
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established by the Rules to disclose more precisely the basis of both 
claim and defense . . . .  Following the simple guide of Rule 8(f) that 
“all pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice,” . . . 
“[t]he Federal Rules reject the approach that pleading is a game of 
skill . . . and accept the principle that the purpose of pleading is to 
facilitate a proper decision on the merits.149 
When taken together, the Court in Twombly and Iqbal solely 
intended to determine what a complaint under Rule 8(a) needs to 
contain to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss,150 not what 
an affirmative defense under Rule 8(c) must contain to survive a 
Rule 12(f) motion to strike.151  Nonetheless, this break from 
Conley’s notice standard necessarily raises the question of 
whether the policies and effects of Twombly and Iqbal will 
require a change to the standard applied to an affirmative 
defense.152 
B. A Standard That Requires Facts to Be Pled Will Combat the 
Twombly and Iqbal Courts’ Concerns Regarding the Cost and 
Broad Scope of Discovery 
Although Twombly and Iqbal only raised the pleading 
standard for a complaint, the Court did set forth a principle that 
should apply to an affirmative defense.153  An affirmative defense 
is not simply a denial, it is an assertion by the defendant 
bringing with it new facts and allegations, which, if true, will 
defeat the plaintiff’s claim, regardless of the complaint’s 
legitimacy.154  As plaintiffs must investigate these assertions, 
 
 149 Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. at 47–48 (1957) (emphasis added), abrogated by Bell 
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 150 See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (holding that when faced with a Rule 12(b)(6) 
motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain “more than labels and conclusions”); Iqbal, 
129 S. Ct. at 1949 (holding that a complaint will only survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to 
dismiss if the complaint “is plausible on its face”) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). 
 151 See supra notes 144–44 and accompanying text.  See also Kevin M. Clermont & 
Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing Systems, 95 IOWA L. REV. 821, 829 n.34 
(2010) (noting that the Twombly and Iqbal Courts were interpreting the word “showing” 
which is inapplicable under Rule 8(c)); Miller, supra note 51, at 101 (“Neither Rule 8(b) 
nor Rule 8(c) contains the magic word ‘showing,’ and both modes of defensive pleading 
typically are alleged in a formulary, conclusory, and uninformative fashion . . . .”). 
 152 As stated, it is this Comment’s proposal that, in light of Twombly and Iqbal, the 
correct standard should require “the defendant to plead an adequate factual basis for [his 
or her] affirmative defenses . . . .” Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Hibbing Taconite 
Co., 266 F.R.D. 260, 268 (D. Minn. 2009). 
 153 See infra notes 154–54 and accompanying text. 
 154 Saks v. Franklin Covey Co., 316 F.3d 337, 350 (2d Cir. 2003).  An affirmative 
defense is comparable to a complaint in that where the plaintiff has the burden to prove 
the allegations in the complaint, the defendant has the burden to prove an affirmative 
defense. See James River Ins. Co. v. Kemper Cas. Ins. Co., 585 F.3d 382, 385 (7th Cir. 
2009) (holding that defendants have the burden of proof regarding an affirmative 
defense); Moore v. Kulicke & Soffa Indus., Inc., 318 F.3d 561, 566 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding 
that the defendant also has “the burden of production and the burden of persuasion for 
[an] affirmative defense”).  This, however, does not render their pleading standard to be 
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affirmative defenses affect the scope of discovery as well.155  
Thus, the Court’s intentions in Twombly and Iqbal to combat 
discovery costs through a heightened pleading requirement 
should apply, to some degree, to affirmative defenses.156 
The Twombly Court was first to pronounce the Court’s 
concern over discovery costs when it explained that the purpose 
of adopting a heightened pleading requirement is to relieve the 
parties of the high costs of discovery wasted on claims or defenses 
which are not actually grounded in a factual basis.157  As Iqbal 
confirmed, the focus of the pleadings now is to ensure that Rule 8 
is not simply the means to discovery for a party “armed with 
nothing more than conclusions.”158   
 
the same.  As noted above, the rules do not set forth the same standard, but rather, set 
forth a lower standard for an affirmative defense. See supra note 144. 
 155 Although raising the pleading standard for a plaintiff will narrow the scope of 
discovery, raising the standard for a defendant will narrow its scope even more, thereby 
reducing costs to both parties.  Thus, simply put, the broader the scope of discovery, the 
more expensive discovery is; while the narrower the scope, the less expensive it becomes. 
Compare Justice Scott Brister, The Decline in Jury Trials: What Would Wal-Mart Do?, 47 
S. TEX. L. REV. 191, 209–10 (2005) (noting that when discovery’s scope is broad, “pretrial 
costs normally far exceed those incurred at trial”), with Dwayne J. Hermes, Jeffrey W. 
Kemp & Paul B. Moore, Leveling the Legal Malpractice Playing Field: Reverse Bifurcation 
of Trials, 36 ST. MARY’S L.J. 879, 920 (2005) (noting that when the scope of discovery is 
limited, it “will often enable the dispute to reach trial sooner than otherwise possible, 
while reducing the discovery costs to the litigants . . . .”). 
 156 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1954 (2009) (holding that where a 
“complaint is deficient under Rule 8, [the complainant] is not entitled to discovery . . . .”); 
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007) (holding that high discovery costs 
create problems in litigation as they may force parties to settle in lieu of facing these 
costs).  Although it is true that this Comment concludes that the pleading standard 
should be lower for affirmative defenses, it does not follow that it should not be raised.  As 
plaintiffs must seek discovery on affirmative defenses, in order to truly fulfill the Court’s 
concern regarding the scope of discovery, the defendant should not simply be allowed to 
assert a host of affirmative defenses without providing the plaintiff with some direction as 
to their factual basis. See Susan S. DeSanti, Whither Antitrust in the Supreme Court?, 7 
ANTITRUST SOURCE 1, 1 (2007) (noting that the Court in Twombly concluded that lower 
federal judges have been unable to control the costs of discovery in antitrust cases); Scott 
Dodson, New Pleading, New Discovery, 109 MICH. L. REV. 53, 64 (2010) (noting that the 
Supreme Court changed the pleading standard due to its concern over “high discovery 
costs”);; Douglas G. Smith, The Twombly Revolution?, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 1063, 1073 (2009) 
(“[T]he Court expressed a concern that discovery costs were only increasing and that 
lawsuits were being settled based on their in terrorem value rather than the actual merits 
of the case.”).  Consistent with the Court’s rationale, many district courts, as noted, 
require facts to be affirmatively stated at the pleading stage. See, e.g., Cosmetic Warriors, 
Ltd. v. Lush Boutique, L.L.C., No. 09-6381, 2010 U.S. Dist LEXIS 16392, at *4 (E.D. La. 
Feb. 1, 2010) (holding that a defendant must provide “factual particularity” in the 
affirmative defense); Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Hibbing Taconite Co., 266 
F.R.D 260, 268 (D. Minn. 2009) (holding that affirmative defenses must be pled with “an 
adequate factual basis”);; Stoffels v. SBC Commc’ns, Inc., No. 05-CV-0233-WWJ, 2008 WL 
4391396, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 22, 2008) (holding that affirmative defenses require 
“‘more than labels and conclusions’” and must be pled with “factual particularity” (quoting 
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007))). 
 157 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559 (quoting Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347 
(2005)). 
 158 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950.  See also Robert G. Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited 
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Thus, as Twombly pointed out, Conley’s requirement that 
mere notice will suffice159 no longer serves its purpose of allowing 
parties to bring their meritorious claims to court.160  Instead of 
fulfilling this goal, oftentimes pleadings were simply a 
mechanism to force another party to settle out of fear that 
discovery costs would make fighting a claim financially 
irresponsible.161  These increased costs often meant that parties 
 
and Revised: A Comment on Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 849, 868 (2010) 
(“[A] screening goal requires greater specificity.  The requisite level of specificity is set by 
the strictness of the pleading standard, which in turn reflects a policy decision about how 
much screening is optimal at the pleading stage.”). 
 159 See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47–48 (1957), abrogated by Bell Atl. Corp. v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 160 Under Conley, pleading did not require parties to have specialized knowledge 
about technicalities and rules; rather, the pleadings were simply meant to “facilitate a 
proper decision on the merits.” Id. at 48.  However, with the increasing costs of discovery, 
allowing such easy access past the pleadings meant that the pleadings may now “push 
cost-conscious defendants to settle even anemic cases before even reaching pretrial 
proceedings.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559.  Thus, the overall concern of the Twombly Court 
was that Conley’s notice pleading allowed parties to abuse discovery “by substituting 
expenses for merits as the driving force behind litigation and settlement dynamics.” 
Jonathan T. Molot, How U.S. Procedure Skews Tort Law Incentives, 73 IND. L.J. 59, 77 
(1997).  The Court’s concern is actually echoed in the Rules themselves.  Rule 1 provides 
that the Rules “should be construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and 
inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.” FED. R. CIV. P. 1.  As discovery 
and litigation in general has grown more expensive though, this mandate by the Rules 
has become less feasible. See Elaine L. Spencer, Common Sense Trial Preparation in a 
High-Tech World, 15 THE PRAC. LITIGATOR 7, 7 (2004) (“Whether representing the plaintiff 
or the defendant, lawyers know that far from being ‘just, speedy, and inexpensive,’ the 
cost of litigation can bar plaintiffs from pursuing their claims and can force defendants to 
settle claims that really should be brought in front of a factfinder.” (quoting FED. R. CIV. 
P. 1)). 
 161 B. Scott Daugherty, Comment, Uncharted Waters: Securities Class Actions in 
Texas After the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, 31 ST. MARY’S L.J. 
143, 160–61, (1999).  Oftentimes then, a litigant with an otherwise meritorious claim 
would be faced with a choice of pursuing litigation and risking that the award would 
outweigh the costs of discovery, or simply settling, foregoing the costs of discovery. See 
Alistair Dawson, House Bill 4 and the Future of Class Action Litigation, 24 THE ADVOC. 
(TEX.) 60, 63 (2003) (noting that “regardless of the merits,” in class action cases, 
oftentimes defendants would prefer to settle than to bear the high cost of discovery); 
Cameron S. Matheson, Transvestite Cowboys, Thieving Brokers, and the Securities 
Litigation Uniform Standards Act: SLUSA’s Trap for the Unwary Plaintiff, 35 MCGEORGE 
L. REV. 121, 126 (2004) (noting that the high costs associated with discovery may allow a 
party with a frivolous suit to force the other party to settle); Sue Ann Mota, Global 
Antitrust Enforcement: The Sherman Act Does Not Apply Without Any Direct Domestic 
Effect, But Discovery Assistance May Be Available to Aid a Foreign Tribunal, According to 
the U.S. Supreme Court, 38 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 495, 510 (2004) (explaining that when 
discovery is involved in litigation, oftentimes its costs “may force parties to settle”);; 
Mathias Reinmann, Liability for Defective Products at the Beginning of the Twenty-First 
Century: Emergence of a Worldwide Standard?, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 751, 817 n.351 (2003) 
(discussing why the high costs of discovery can work against a plaintiff as “those with 
small and medium-sized claims” may not be able to fully pursue these claims as the costs 
of discovery will often outweigh the small sum sought in the recovery); Jessica Lynn Repa, 
Comment, Adjudicating Beyond the Scope of Ordinary Business: Why the Inaccessibility 
Test in Zubulake Unduly Stifles Cost-Shifting During Electronic Discovery, 54 AM. U. L. 
REV. 257, 295–96 (2004) (noting that high discovery costs create incentives to settle, even 
for meritorious suits).  Furthermore, not only are discovery costs excessive, much of it 
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with meritorious claims, but small amounts sought in the 
recovery, would have to forgo their claims, as the amount sought 
would not outweigh the costs of discovery.162  This is particularly 
true with electronic discovery in which “[t]he sheer volume of 
electronic data that may be responsive to a given document 
request can burden the responding party with tremendous 
costs.”163  Although the mere act of producing electronic discovery 
may not be significant, the data that is responsive to a particular 
discovery request must be screened for privileged information, 
which in turn can be complex and create high costs for the 
responding party.164  With the increasing costs of discovery and 
 
results from pure waste. See Thomas E. Willging, Donna Stienstra, John Shapard & Dean 
Miletich, An Empirical Study of Discovery and Disclosure Practice Under the 1993 Federal 
Rule Amendments, 39 B.C. L. REV. 525, 551 (1998) [hereinafter Willging et al., Empirical 
Study] (concluding that when discovery costs are disproportionately high, much of the 
information obtained in discovery is ultimately irrelevant to the case). 
 162 See Christopher M. Grengs & Edward S. Adams, Contracting Around Finality: 
Transforming Price v. Neal from Dictate to Default, 89 MINN. L. REV. 163, 186 n.172 
(2004).  Instead of individually bringing a claim, high discovery costs may force the 
litigant to seek a class that can sue collectively, out of fear that the costs of discovery will 
outweigh any potential damage claims brought individually. See Barry Litt & Genie 
Harrison, Rights for Wrongs, L.A. LAW., Dec. 2005, at 27 (noting that in order to properly 
compensate victims with small sums sought in recovery, the only cost-effective way may 
be to bring a class action). 
 163 Thomas R. Mulroy & Kristopher Stark, Article, A Suggested Rule for Electronic 
Discovery in Illinois Administrative Proceedings, 3 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 1, 6–7 (2004) 
(describing a case where one party “spent $1.75 million to restore backup tapes to retrieve 
email.”).  Thus, with the increase in electronic products available and the increased use of 
technology, comes a concomitant rise in the amount of information that is discoverable. 
See THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES: BEST PRACTICES, RECOMMENDATIONS & PRINCIPLES FOR 
ADDRESSING ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT PRODUCTION 7 (Jonathan M. Redgrave et al. eds., 
2005) (noting that electronic documents have now surpassed the amount of paper 
documents which has increased “the amount of information available for potential 
discovery”);; Mulroy & Stark, supra, at 1 (explaining how an increase in reliance on 
technology brings about an increase in the amount of information that may be 
discoverable during litigation); Sonia Salinas, Electronic Discovery and Cost Shifting: Who 
Foots the Bill?, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1639, 1640 (2005) (discussing that with the increased 
use of technology and computers, a dramatic rise in the cost of discovery has ensued.  Now 
simply requesting a document “may include not only the paper copy of the document, but 
also various versions saved on a network or hard drive”);; Paul Travis, The Cost of E-
Discovery, NETWORK COMPUTING (May 9, 2009), http://www.networkcomputing.com/e-
discovery/the-cost-of-e-discovery.php?type=article (“Businesses and other organizations 
spent more than $2.7 billion on electronic data discovery last year [EDD], and spending 
on EDD will grow to more than $4.6 billion by 2010 . . . .”). 
 164 Ronald J. Hedges, Discovery of Digital Information, in ELECTRONIC RECORDS 
MANAGEMENT AND DIGITAL DISCOVERY 221, 258 (ALI-ABA Course of Study Materials 
SK071, 2005).  See also Steven C. Bennett, Marla S.K. Bergman & Jones Day, Ethical 
Issues in Electronic Discovery, in ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY AND RETENTION GUIDANCE FOR 
CORPORATE COUNSEL 2005, 379, 386 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice, Course Handbook Ser. 
No. 733, 2005) (noting that due to the multitude of ways to now create and send 
information, a correlative increase in the costs of discovery has ensued); Richard Van 
Duizend, Guidelines for State Trial Courts Regarding Discovery of Electronically-Stored 
Information—What? Why? How?, 35 W. ST. U. L. REV. 237, 240 (2007) (discussing how the 
high costs of discovery can be attributed to the “costs of experts” needed to prepare the 
information); Robert E. Altman & Benjamin Lewis, Note, Cost-Shifting in ESI Discovery 
Disputes: A Five Factor Test to Promote Consistency and Set Party Expectations, 36 N. KY. 
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electronic discovery, a pleading standard focused on providing 
factual support to the plaintiff will assist tremendously in 
narrowing the scope of discovery and, thus, reducing these 
costs.165 
To be fair though, there is another side to the debate as to 
whether discovery costs truly are an issue today.  Although there 
are studies that show discovery costs have gotten out of 
control,166 some argue that it is only a small number of cases with 
high discovery costs which “generate[] the anecdotal ‘parade of 
horribles’” causing such concern among those seeking changes to 
the discovery controls and procedures.167  One recent study found 
 
L. REV. 569, 571 (2009) (“[O]ne primary reason for the high costs of electronic discovery is 
simply the large volume of ESI [electronically stored information].”). 
 165 See Robins, supra note 29, at 642 (arguing that by requiring facts to be pled, the 
opposing party at least has “knowledge of the basis for the claim [or defense], thus 
manifesting any known basis for the claim’s legitimacy”);; Marlaina S. Freisthler, 
Comment, Unfettered Discretion: Is Gonzaga University v. Doe a Constructive End to 
Enforcement of Medicaid Provider Reimbursement Provisions?, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1397, 
1415–16 (2003) (“In fact, ‘in civil cases, high discovery costs and legal fees render legal 
assistance beyond the financial reach of ninety percent of the nation.’” (citing Joseph M. 
McLaughlin, An Extension of the Right of Access: The Pro Se Litigant’s Right to 
Notification of the Requirements of the Summary Judgment Rule, 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1109, 1135 (1987))).  Thus, the plaintiff should not be the sole bearer of a heightened 
pleading requirement; rather, it should be up to both pleadings to narrow the scope of 
discovery. See Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Reforming the New Discovery 
Rules, 84 GEO. L.J. 61, 75 (1995).  Furthermore, in creating a heightened pleading 
requirement for both parties, access to the courts will be equalized in that both the 
wealthy and the average person will be more likely to be able to afford the costs of 
litigation. See Allegra J. Lawrence-Hardy & Nathan D. Chapman, Clarity of Chaos? 




20-%20Ashcroft%20v%20%20Iqbal%20One%20Year%20Lat.pdf (“[C]ourts have noted that 
the desire to avoid unnecessary discovery applies with equal force [to defendants] as 
well.”);; John Burritt McArthur, Inter-Branch Politics and the Judicial Resistance to 
Federal Civil Justice Reform, 33 U.S.F. L. REV. 551, 617 (1999) (noting that most groups, 
even “corporate counsel,” believe that discovery costs create inequities as the wealthy can 
bear the costs, but the average person cannot do so). 
 166 See INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., INTERIM REPORT ON THE 
JOINT PROJECT OF THE AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYER’S TASK FORCE ON 
DISCOVERY AND THE INSTITUTE FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 
A-4 (2008), available at http://www.actl.com/AM/Template.cfm?Section= 
Home&CONTENTID=3650&TEMPLATE=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm (finding that of those 
attorneys surveyed, “[o]ver 75% . . . agreed that discovery costs, as a share of total 
litigation costs, have increased disproportionately due to the advent of e-discovery”).  See 
also Michael P. Catina & Cindy M. Schmitt, Note, Private Securities Litigation: The Need 
for Reform, 13 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 295, 303 (1998) (noting that when plaintiffs 
use discovery simply as a “fishing expedition[]” its costs will often cause defendants to 
settle in lieu of dealing with the continuous discovery requests); Hon. Shira A. Scheindlin 
& Jeffrey Rabkin, Electronic Discovery in Federal Civil Litigation: Is Rule 34 Up to the 
Task?, 41 B.C. L. REV. 327, 367 (2000) (noting that as the amount of discoverable 
information continues to grow, discovery costs will do so as well). 
 167 Linda S. Mullenix, The Pervasive Myth of Pervasive Discovery Abuse: The Sequel, 
39 B.C. L. REV. 683, 685 (1998) (quoting James S. Kakalik et al., Discovery Management: 
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that the median discovery costs today are on par with those of 
the 1990s after adjustments are made for inflation, and that the 
“monetary stakes in the litigation represent the primary cost 
driver in most civil litigation.”168  Thus, the argument goes, the 
majority of cases today actually do not have to deal with high 
discovery costs,169 and so there is no need to change the current 
pleading scheme or discovery rules.170 
Whether it is only a small number of cases in which 
discovery costs are high, or whether discovery costs are high 
across the board, the fact is that discovery costs are high, and 
furthermore, the Supreme Court has announced its 
interpretation of Rule 8, along with its intention to use the 
pleadings as a mechanism to control discovery.171  Requiring an 
adequate factual basis to be pled is consistent with this intention, 
as attorneys will now have to plead factual support for their 
defenses, which in turn means that the plaintiff will have a much 
more effective way to focus the scope of discovery, thereby 
reducing costs.172  In fact, in a recent survey conducted by the 
 
Further Analysis of the Civil Justice Reform Act Evaluation Data, 39 B.C. L. REV. 613, 
636 (1998)). 
 168 Emory G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, Defining the Problem of Cost in Federal 
Civil Litigation, 60 DUKE L.J. 765, 770–72 (2010).  Thus, many studies have shown that 
for the most part, parties are fairly reasonable in their discovery requests, and do not use 
discovery as a means to harass the other side. See Elizabeth Thornburg, Designer Trials, 
2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 181, 202 n.116 (2006) (noting that the majority of research conducted 
actually finds that discovery costs are reasonable); Willging et al., Empirical Study, supra 
note 161, at 527 (concluding that high discovery costs are normally associated only with 
the most complex cases, and the average case is actually “conducted at costs that are 
proportionate to the stakes of the litigation . . . .”). 
 169 Kakalik et al., supra note 167, at 636.  Thus, these proponents argue that the data 
relied on by others skews the truth, in that it fails to display that the large costs of 
discovery are truly only borne by a small few who are engaged in complex litigation.  See 
The Honorable John P. Sullivan, Twombly and Iqbal: The Latest Retreat From Notice 
Pleading, 43 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 54–55 (2009). 
 170 See Sullivan, supra note 169, at 55.  
 171 See supra notes 154–156 and accompanying text.  It should be fairly apparent that 
it is not up to the lower courts to second-guess the findings of the Supreme Court. See 
Gonzalez v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corrs., 366 F.3d 1253, 1281 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding that 
lower federal courts “must follow” a “Supreme Court decision . . . regardless of whether 
[the lower court] would have arrived at a different approach.”), aff’d sub nom. Gonzalez v. 
Crosby, 545 U.S. 524 (2005); Levine v. Heffernan, 864 F.2d 457, 459 (7th Cir. 1988) 
(holding that Supreme Court decisions must be followed by lower courts).  Therefore, 
whichever side courts would like to fall on in the cost of discovery debate, the Supreme 
Court has already chosen a side, and lower courts must take the same side.  Thus, the 
issue in this context is not whether the Supreme Court is right, but rather, the issue 
becomes one of how to properly implement its decision. 
 172 Molot, supra note 25, at 982–83.  Fact pleading greatly assists litigants, as it 
requires more than a mere labeling of a claim or defense, but also the basis for that claim 
or defense. See Michele Taruffo, Rethinking the Standards of Proof, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 
659, 675 (2003).  This prevents attorneys from quickly filing boilerplate claims or 
defenses, as the attorney must investigate said claims or defenses and determine if there 
is any factual basis to them. Id.  Having conducted this initial investigation, once the 
claim or defense is filed, the parties have less need to search for relevant facts or evidence 
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Institute for the Advancement of the American Legal System, 
“[o]ver 64% of [respondents] indicated that fact pleading can 
narrow the scope of discovery.”173  Therefore, a federal regime, 
which is now truly focused on using pleadings to control the 
scope and costs of discovery,174 should adopt a pleading standard 
consistent with that purpose.175 
 
to support the claim or defense. Id.  With such basis in hand, a pleader has the ability to 
properly control the scope and costs of discovery. See Gregory Gelfand & Howard B. 
Abrams, Putting Erie on the Right Track, 49 U. PITT. L. REV. 937, 977 n.128 (1998) 
(discussing how adopting a heightened pleading standard will narrow the scope of 
discovery).  See also Thomas O. Main, Procedural Uniformity and the Exaggerated Role of 
Rules: A Survey of Intra-State Uniformity in Three States That Have Not Adopted the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 46 VILL. L. REV. 311, 334 (2001) (“[T]he badges of fact 
pleading included[:] . . .  (ii) demanding ‘specificity’ or ‘particularity’ on each element of a 
claim or cause of action; (iii) expressing dissatisfaction with ‘conclusory’ allegations; [and] 
(iv) deploring the evil of ‘frivolous’ litigation . . . .”);; Roger T. Brice & Penny Nathan 
Kahan, Discovery Issues in Employment Discrimination Cases—Including Views From the 
Bench, in 32ND ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON EMPLOYMENT LAW VOL. ONE 567, 613 (PLI Litig. & 
Admin. Practice, Course Handbook Ser. No. H-696, 2003) (arguing that in order to 
decrease the costs of electronic discovery, the scope of discovery must be narrowed). 
 173 INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., supra note 166, at A-3. 
 174 See supra Part II (describing the Supreme Court’s shift from using pleadings as a 
means to access discovery to using pleadings as a means to narrow issues and lower the 
costs of discovery). 
 175 See supra note 165 and accompanying text.  A pleading standard that will require 
all affirmative defenses to be pled with an adequate factual basis is consistent with this 
purpose.  A fact pleading standard will create more specificity in the pleadings and less 
opportunity for deceit.  Through these benefits, discovery costs will necessarily be 
decreased as the parties will have some semblance of an idea as to how to properly focus 
discovery. See Burroughs, supra note 30, at 78 (noting that fact “pleading[] serve[s] to 
narrow the issues in litigation, identify baseless claims, and present each party’s position 
based upon the facts as known to them”);; Bedora A. Sheronick, Comment, Rock, Scissors, 
Paper: The Federal Rule 26(a)(1) “Gamble” in Iowa, 80 IOWA L. REV. 363, 381 (1995) 
(discussing that a regime requiring facts to be pled from the beginning of litigation has 
two major benefits; namely (1) that discovery costs will be decreased; and (2) the issues 
for trial, as well as discovery, will be narrowed).  Another incidental benefit of adopting 
such a fact-based standard for affirmative defenses would occur in the insurance litigation 
realm. See R. Nicholas Gimbel & Elizabeth W. Fox, Key Discovery Battlegrounds 
Regarding Coverage Under CGL Policies, in INSURANCE COVERAGE LITIGATION: RECOVERY 
IN THE 1990S AND BEYOND 305, 310 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice, Course Handbook Ser. 
No. H-598, 1999) (discussing how insurance companies will allege affirmative defenses 
simply to “act as place keepers or reservations depending on what is uncovered during the 
course of discovery”).  For fear of waiving an affirmative defense that may end up freeing 
the insurance company from liability, insurance companies will plead “every conceivable 
affirmative defense,” even those with no factual support. See Richard D. Milone & 
Stephen R. Freeland, The Kitchen Sink Approach, CONN. L. TRIB., May 2008, at 1, 
available at http://www.kelleydrye.com/publications/articles/0371/_res/id=Files/index=0/ 
0371.pdf.  What is worse, is that insurance companies will “resist[] all efforts by the 
insured to obtain discovery of the factual basis for such alleged defenses.” Amanda 
Hairston, Insurer Ordered to Produce Facts Regarding Affirmative Defenses, Drafting 
History and Underwriting Testimony, FARELLA BRAUN & MARTEL, LLP (Mar. 23, 2010), 
http://www.farellacoveragelaw.com/2010/03/insurer-ordered-to-produce-facts.html.  Such 
practice has become standard, which has only resulted in higher costs for litigation, as the 
plaintiff has little direction in how to focus his or her discovery requests. See Ray E. 
Critchett, Ferreting Out Affirmative Defenses, 19 OHIO TRIAL 26, 26 (2009), available at 
http://www.buckeyelaw.com/team/e_ray_critchett/Affirmative_Defenses.pdf. 
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C. It Is Unfair to Hold a Defendant to a Plausibility Standard 
as a Defendant Has Only Twenty-One Days to Respond to a 
Complaint That May Have Been Prepared for Years 
Although the Twombly and Iqbal Courts set forth a principle 
that should apply to an affirmative defense, applying the 
plausibility standard to a defendant is patently unfair.176  
Imagine you have been in a car accident in which the other 
driver has suffered substantial injuries.  That driver, having 
taken two years to gather enough information about the accident, 
sues you in federal district court (assume there is diversity 
jurisdiction)177 alleging that your negligence was the sole cause of 
the accident.  That driver has you personally served with the 
summons and complaint.178  You now have twenty-one days to 
respond.179  It takes you a week to find a lawyer you can afford, 
and now your time to respond is only fourteen days.180  Another 
week goes by, and your attorney decides to plead some 
affirmative defenses in hopes that one of them will apply, or at 
the least, will provide a basis for discovery.181  Since you decline 
to include any factual support gathered during an initial 
investigation, your affirmative defense simply states: “Plaintiff’s 
 
 176 See supra notes 152–155 and accompanying text (explaining why narrowing the 
scope of discovery should apply to a defendant as well as to a plaintiff). 
 177 Assume that the other driver is a citizen of another state and is suing you for 
$75,001. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2006) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction 
of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, 
exclusive of interest and costs, and is between . . . citizens of different States . . . .”). 
 178 See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(c).  Further assume that the driver has successfully pled 
enough facts to lead a judge to believe her complaint is plausible on its face. See Ashcroft 
v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). 
 179 See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(a)(1)(A)(i) (noting that in the absence of waiver of summons, 
the defendant’s time to answer is not extended beyond twenty-one days). 
 180 Rule 6 defines the standards for computing time. FED. R. CIV. P. 6.  Under that 
rule: 
When the [time to respond] is stated in days or a longer unit of time: (A) 
exclude the day of the event that triggers the period; (B) count every day, 
including intermediate Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays; and (C) include 
the last day of the period, but if the last day is a Saturday, Sunday, or legal 
holiday, the period continues to run until the end of the next day that is not a 
Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday. 
Id.  Thus, for purposes of the above hypothetical, assume you were served on January 7, 
2011.  The deadline for your response would be January 28, 2011. FED. R. CIV. P. 
12(a)(1)(A)(i). 
 181 It is common practice to plead all affirmative defenses which may apply in hopes 
of later ascertaining relevant evidence to rid the defendant of liability. See Gimbel & Fox, 
supra note 175, at 309–10 (1999) (describing how insurance companies plead any and all 
defenses in the hopes that one will apply).  See also Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Chiles 
Power Supply, Inc., 332 F.3d 976, 979 (6th Cir. 2003) (noting that discovery under the 
Rules “provides that ‘[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, 
that is relevant to the claim or defense of any party . . . .’” (emphasis omitted) (quoting 
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1))). 
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negligence was the sole cause of the accident.”182  With two days 
before the twenty-one day timeline runs up, your attorney files 
your answer.  Another two weeks go by, and the plaintiff files a 
motion to strike your affirmative defense.183  What result? 
Under this Comment’s proposed standard, this affirmative 
defense would most certainly fail184 as it lacks any factual basis 
to support it, and instead, pleads only a conclusory allegation.185  
By neglecting to provide the plaintiff with the facts used to 
support the defense, the plaintiff is stuck pondering the various 
ways the defendant may believe the plaintiff has been 
contributorily negligent.186  One could hypothesize a multitude of 
ways this could be true: (1) Plaintiff may have been driving while 
intoxicated;187 (2) Plaintiff may have been speeding;188 (3) 
Plaintiff may have failed to drive on the right side of the road;189 
or (4) Plaintiff may have failed to yield the right of way.190  The 
list could go on, but one can understand the difficulties a plaintiff 
 
 182 Rule 8(c)(1) lists a number of affirmative defenses including contributory 
negligence. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c)(1). 
 183 See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(f). 
 184 However, it would very likely survive a pre-Twombly motion to strike, because 
merely listing the affirmative defense correctly was often acceptable. See, e.g., Home Ins. 
Co. v. Matthews, 998 F.2d 305, 309 (5th Cir. 1993) (“A plea that simply states that 
complainant was guilty of contributory negligence . . . is sufficient.”). 
 185 A number of district courts held that conclusory allegations in an affirmative 
defense are no longer acceptable. See, e.g., Palmer v. Oakland Farms, Inc., 
No. 5: 10cv00029, 2010 WL 2605179, at *6 (W.D. Va. June 24, 2010) (striking the 
defendant’s affirmative defenses for being conclusory);; Barnes v. AT&T Pension Benefit 
Plan-Nonbargained Program, 718 F. Supp. 2d 1167, 1172–73 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (striking 
affirmative defenses for consisting largely of “conclusory statements”);; Burns v. Dodeka, 
L.L.C., No. 4:09-CV-19-BJ, 2010 WL 1903987, at *1 (N.D. Tex. May 11, 2010) (striking 
affirmative defenses that “are wholly conclusory and fail to plead any facts that 
demonstrate the plausibility of such defenses as required by Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 
Twombly . . . .”).  Regardless of the standard ultimately adopted by courts, this appears to 
be a fairly common minimum standard and is something in which litigators should be 
aware. See David N. Anthony & Timothy J. St. George, “Plausibility” Pleading After 
Twombly and Iqbal, 21 THE PRAC. LITIGATOR 9, 13 (2010), available at 
http://www.troutmansanders.com/files/Uploads/Documents/iqbal2.pdf (“Since Iqbal[,] . . . 
certain courts are displaying an increasing tendency to scrutinize such ‘bare-boned’ 
averments on the basis that such pleading does not comport with the standards 
articulated in Twombly and Iqbal.”). 
 186 See Hayne v. Green Ford Sales, Inc., 263 F.R.D. 647, 650 (D. Kan. 2009) 
(indicating that “the purpose of pleading requirements is to provide . . . some plausible, 
factual basis for the assertion and not simply a suggestion of possibility that it may apply 
to the case”). 
 187 See Scott v. Thompson, 109 Cal. Rptr. 3d 846, 847 (2010) (alleging driver’s 
intoxication constituted negligence), modified, No. G041860, 2010 Cal. App. LEXIS 996 
(June 25, 2010). 
 188 See Rodkey v. City of Escondido, 67 P.2d 1053, 1055 (Cal. 1937) (holding driver 
negligent for driving over storm drain while speeding). 
 189 See People v. Thompson, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 803, 808 (2000) (stating that “failure to 
drive on right side of road” can constitute negligence), modified, No. H017519, 2000 Cal. 
App. LEXIS 282 (April 14, 2000). 
 190 See Jeld-Wen, Inc. v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. Rptr. 3d 351, 356 (2005) (alleging 
negligence for “failure to yield right of way”). 
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would face if mere notice were required.191  On the other hand, if 
Twombly’s and Iqbal’s plausibility standard were applied, the 
defendant would have to plead enough facts to raise the 
affirmative defense to a level of plausibility.192  This may require 
an entire host of responses, such as alleging that the plaintiff had 
been drinking sometime in the day or alleging that the plaintiff 
had been drinking thirty minutes prior to the accident, for a 
specific length of time, which was the sole cause of the 
accident.193  However, by only requiring “the defendant to plead 
an adequate factual basis for [the] affirmative defense[,]”194 the 
 
 191 See John S. Beckerman, Confronting Civil Discovery’s Fatal Flaws, 84 MINN. L. 
REV. 505, 517 (2000) (“[T]he information-gathering and issue-defining functions that 
discovery must perform in a notice-pleading regime require broad and often copious 
discovery that generates disputes that require judicial intervention to resolve.  Depending 
on one’s definition, this voluminous discovery may also lend itself to ‘abuse.’”).  One main 
concern about notice pleading, then, is that it largely left the other pleader in the dark.  
Deprived of any knowledge as to what basis there was for a claim or defense, the other 
party, quite understandably so, sought as much information as possible in discovery in 
order to protect him or herself. See Mark E. Chopko, Continuing the Lord’s Work and 
Healing His People: A Reply to Professors Lupu and Tuttle, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1897, 1916 
n.113 (2004) (discussing that under a system of notice pleading, “the parties might guess 
what discovery might bring”);; Emeka Duruigbo, The Economic Cost of Alien Tort 
Litigation: A Response to Awakening Monster: The Alien Tort Statute of 1789, 14 MINN. J. 
GLOBAL TRADE 1, 33 (2004) (“[T]he notice pleading system and discovery rules in the 
United States are so liberal that they allow plaintiffs to bring suits based on minimal 
facts with ample room to flesh them out later.”);; Marcus, supra note 23, at 492 (noting 
that notice pleading allows parties access to broad discovery which can easily lend itself to 
abuse); Stephen N. Subrin & Thomas O. Main, The Integration of Law and Fact in an 
Uncharted Parallel Procedural Universe, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1981, 2001 (2004) 
(arguing that under a system of notice pleading, it is difficult for the opposing party to 
understand the factual basis for the other’s claim or defense). 
 192 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). 
 193 See, e.g., Watts v. Fla. Int’l Univ., 495 F.3d 1289, 1296 (11th Cir. 2007) (adopting 
the plausibility standard in civil rights actions, requiring the complainant to “allege[] 
enough facts to suggest, raise a reasonable expectation of, and render plausible the fact 
that he sincerely held the religious belief that got him fired”); Allison Sirica, Case 
Comment, The New Federal Pleading Standard: Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009), 
62 FLA. L. REV. 547, 554 (2010) (noting the difficulty in determining how many facts are 
required to be pled in order to render a claim plausible).  As stated, this Comment does 
not criticize the plausibility standard as applied to a complaint.  The purpose of this 
paragraph is only to display that whatever the particular requirements of the plausibility 
standard actually are, they are necessarily higher than that of a standard which only 
requires facts to be pled. See Michael Eaton, The Key to the Courthouse Door: The Effect of 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal and the Heightened Pleading Standard, 51 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 299, 
314 (2011) (noting that “after Iqbal the pleading standard is notably higher. . . .”).  
Compare Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (holding that “a complaint must contain sufficient 
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face’” 
(emphasis added) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007))), with 
Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n  v. Hibbing Taconite Co., 266 F.R.D. 260, 268 (D. Minn. 
2009) (holding that the defendant only needs “to plead an adequate factual basis for 
affirmative defenses, where the basis is not apparent by the defense’s bare assertion”).  
For a discussion on the uncertainty a party faces when held to a plausibility standard, see 
Pamela Atkins, Twombly, Iqbal Introduce More Subjectivity to Rulings on Dismissal 
Motions, Judge Says, 78 U.S.L. WK. 2667, 2667 (2010) (“[T]he new approach calls for 
‘tremendous subjectivity’ on the part of a judge reviewing motions to dismiss.”). 
 194 EEOC, 266 F.R.D. at 268. 
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defendant is given much greater control over whether or not that 
defense will survive a motion to strike.195   
The point is that a plaintiff may have years to decide when 
to file a complaint, 196 while a defendant only has twenty-one 
days to respond.197  Responding to a complaint requires a host of 
actions by the defendant within this mere twenty-one day 
timeline, such as hiring an attorney, researching the complaint 
and applicable defenses, and communicating with the attorney 
regarding the appropriate strategy for the case.198  Given the 
time disparities, it is not unreasonable to require more factual 
development of a plaintiff at the pleading stage.199  Worse yet, if 
 
 195 The defendant has greater control because the judge is not required to assess the 
ability of the defendant to prove what is being pled.  Rather, the defendant simply has to 
provide the factual basis for the defense so that the plaintiff can efficiently narrow the 
scope of his or her discovery.  Thus, the defendant’s attorney would know that he or she 
cannot merely assert any boilerplate defense, but would have to first uncover some factual 
basis for the defense.  See Hayne v. Green Ford Sales, Inc., 263 F.R.D. 647, 650 (D. Kan. 
2009) (asserting the importance of facts in affirmative defenses rather than mere 
conjectures that may apply); HCRI TRS Acquirer, LLC v. Iwer, 708 F. Supp. 2d 687, 691 
(N.D. Ohio 2010) (noting that boilerplate affirmative defenses can negatively impact 
litigation costs); Gambol, supra note 52, at 2198 (footnote omitted) (stating that providing 
a factual basis allows the adverse party to tailor discovery).  Furthermore, by pleading an 
affirmative defense, the defendant is not somehow making discovery available to him or 
herself.  It is the complaint that “unlock[s] the doors of discovery.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 
1950.  See also FTC v. Hope Now Modifications, L.L.C., No. 09-1204, 2011 WL 883202, at 
*3 (D. N.J. Mar. 10, 2011).  Thus, “should the [p]laintiff need to request the factual basis 
of an asserted affirmative defense . . . Twombly and Iqbal do not counsel otherwise.” Id. 
 196 See, e.g., Allstar Mayflower, L.L.C. v. United States, 93 Fed. Cl. 169, 171 (2010) 
(applying the three year statute of limitations under the Interstate Commerce Act); 
Simpson v. Merchs. & Planters Bank, 441 F.3d 572, 579 (8th Cir. 2006) (holding that the 
statute of limitations under the Equal Pay Act is three years).   
 197 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(a)(1)(A)(i). 
 198 Michael A. Iannucci, Changing the Game: The Effect of Twombly/Iqbal on 
Affirmative Defenses, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER (Oct. 25, 2010), 
http://www.blankrome.com/pdf.cfm?contentID=37&itemID=2336. 
 199 See Holdbrook v. SAIA Motor Freight Line, L.L.C., No. 09-cv-02870-LTB-BNB, 
2010 WL 865380, at *2 (D. Colo. Mar. 8, 2010).  It has been argued that in Twombly and 
Iqbal the Court was establishing “a gatekeeping test” for parties seeking to bring suit into 
court. Clermont, supra note 143, at 1360.  As defendants do not initiate litigation, the 
argument goes that this test should not apply to them. Id.  However, this Comment does 
not go as far to conclude that no change should be made to the pleading standard for 
affirmative defenses.  This Comment does, though, note the inherent unfairness in 
requiring a defendant to file a response to a complaint, which may have been researched 
for years, within twenty-one days. See R. David Donoghue, The Uneven Application of 
Twombly in Patent Cases: An Argument for Leveling the Playing Field, 8 J. MARSHALL 
REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 12 (2008) (arguing that in patent cases, giving defendants either 
twenty days or sixty days to file a plausible defense is “unrealistic . . . . [because] [d]uring 
those three to eight weeks, a defendant must digest the complaint, hire counsel, analyze 
the patent and the alleged infringement, and at least sketch out a ‘plausible’ set of 
noninfringement and invalidity defenses, all while continuing to meet the obligations of 
defendant’s business”).  Thus, a balance needs to be struck, and it is this Comment’s 
ultimate proposal that a pleading standard requiring a factual basis to be pled is this 
balance.  Furthermore, a proper application of this Comment’s proposed rule would 
examine the affirmative defense in conjunction with the complaint.  This would best 
provide the reviewing court and the parties with the proper and most complete factual 
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the defendant fails to plead an affirmative defense, that defense 
is generally waived and likely to be permanently excluded from 
the case.200  “[A]lthough the court, in its discretion, may give the 
defendant leave to amend” its insufficiently pled affirmative 
defense,201 this is by no means a guarantee, and a defendant 
should attempt to plead as many applicable defenses as possible 
at the pleading stage.202 
Of course a defendant could simply plead any and all 
affirmative defenses in the mere hope that one will survive a 
motion to strike.203  This would be acceptable, but for Rule 11.204  
Rule 11, among other things, requires any pleading filed by an 
attorney to “have evidentiary support or . . . [to be] likely [to] 
have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for 
further investigation or discovery . . . .”205  Thus, a defendant who 
asserts an affirmative defense without reasonably believing the 
 
basis for the defendant’s affirmative defenses. See Baum v. Faith Techs., Inc., No. 10-CV-
0144-CVE-TLW, 2010 WL 2365451, at *3 (N.D. Okla. June 9, 2010) (noting that when 
taken together, a complaint and an answer provide a plaintiff with sufficient notice of the 
affirmative defense). 
 200 Harris v. Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 126 F.3d 339, 343 (D.C. Cir. 1997) 
(quoting Dole v. Williams Enters., Inc., 876 F.2d 186, 189 (D.C. Cir. 1989)). 
 201 See JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL, MARY KAY KANE & ARTHUR R. MILLER, CIVIL 
PROCEDURE 297–98 (3d ed. 1999). 
 202 See JAMES ET AL., supra note 39, at 253.  Thus, to be safe, it is generally advised, 
or at least was advised under Conley’s standard, that a defendant should plead any and 
all defenses that may apply in order to avoid missing out on a defense that may 
ultimately relieve the defendant of liability. See Robinson v. Johnson, 313 F.3d 128, 134 
(3d Cir. 2002) (“Parties are generally required to assert affirmative defenses early in 
litigation, so they may be ruled upon, prejudice may be avoided, and judicial resources 
may be conserved.”);; Campania Mgmt. Co. v. Rooks, Pitts & Poust, 290 F.3d 843, 852 (7th. 
Cir. 2002) (citing Grain Traders Inc. v. Citibank, N.A., 160 F.3d 97, 105 (2d Cir. 1998)); 
Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Moore, 783 F.2d 1326, 1327–28 (9th Cir. 1986)) (holding that a party 
cannot assert an affirmative defense after failing to do so in the answer); SRAM Corp. v. 
Shimano, Inc., 25 F. App’x 626, 629 (9th. Cir. 2002) (citing Nw. Acceptance Corp. v. 
Lynnwood Equip., Inc., 841 F.2d 918, 924 (9th Cir. 1988) (“Where a defendant fails to 
raise the defense in a pretrial order or prior to trial, the defense is waived.”);; Wilkes 
Assocs. v. Hollander Indus. Corp., 144 F. Supp. 2d 944, 951 (S.D. Ohio 2001) (stating that 
Rule 8(c) requires a defendant to plead all applicable affirmative defenses in the answer); 
FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 201, at 299 (“A careful pleader necessarily will set forth 
every conceivable fact that she might wish to prove as one never can be certain what a 
court will hold to be a ‘surprise.’”). 
 203 See, e.g., Anthony & St. George, supra note 185, at 13 (noting that it is a “common 
litigation strategy” for attorneys to plead as many affirmative defenses as possible at the 
pleading stage); Richard G. Morgan & William N.G. Barron IV, Evolving with Affirmative 
Defense Pleading Standard, LAW360 (2010), http://www.bowmanandbrooke.com/ 
files/News/c3d848bb-cc6e-42dc-985e-8f5f99ed161f/Presentation/NewsAttachment/ 
6573e813-8556-46af-9071-91d09edf6477/Law360%20-%200310.pdf (explaining that the 
reason behind pleading all possible affirmative defenses is to avoid having those defenses 
waived and excluded from the case). 
 204 See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (detailing how pleadings, motions, and other 
papers should be signed, the representations an attorney makes to the court and the use 
of sanctions). 
 205 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(3). 
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defense to be “factually and legally justified” will likely subject 
him or herself to Rule 11 sanctions.206 
Taken together with Twombly and Iqbal, a defendant’s 
attorney is torn between risking the filing of an affirmative 
defense that reasonably is not, or could not be, plausible and thus 
subject to Rule 11 sanctions, and filing an affirmative defense 
that may surpass Rule 11’s floor, but still fails to rise to a level of 
plausibility and, thus, is stricken permanently from the case.207  
 
 206 Kaplan v. DaimlerChrysler, A.G., 331 F.3d 1251, 1255 (11th Cir. 2003).  See FTC 
v. Hope Now Modifications, L.L.C., No. 09-1204 (JBS/JS), 2011 WL 883202, at *4 (D. N.J. 
Mar. 10, 2011) (noting that “although Twombly and Iqbal do not require specificity in 
stating defenses,” a defendant’s counsel who pleads a frivolous defense may be subject to 
Rule 11 sanctions).  Furthermore, a defendant’s “subjective good faith” belief is not 
enough and there must be actual support for the affirmative defense. Eastway Constr. 
Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 253 (2d Cir. 1985).  For a list of possible 
sanctions for violating Rule 11, see FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee’s note (noting 
that possible sanctions for violating Rule 11 include “striking the offending paper; issuing 
an admonition, reprimand, or censure; requiring participation in seminars or other 
educational programs; ordering a fine payable to the court; [or] referring the matter to 
disciplinary authorities . . . .”).  For cases where defendant’s attorneys were sanctioned for 
filing affirmative defenses in violation of Rule 11, see Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Kellogg, 
856 F. Supp. 25, 33 (D. N.H. 1994) (awarding sanctions because defendant’s counsel failed 
“to make a reasonable inquiry” into the legal basis for the affirmative defense pled); 
Kramer, Levin, Nessen, Kamin & Frankel v. Aronoff, 638 F. Supp. 714, 725–26 (S.D.N.Y. 
1986) (awarding attorneys’ fees for attorney filing a frivolous affirmative defense which 
caused plaintiff’s counsel to expend funds in the investigation of the defense). 
 207 See D. Jeffrey Campbell & Jonathan R. Kuhlman, Civil Justice Reform Act of 
1990: An Experiment Gone Awry, 60 DEF. COUNS. J. 17, 28 (1993) (explaining that Rule 11 
can harm a defendant because the defendant likely does not have much factual support 
for an affirmative defense prior to discovery and thus when it does come time for 
discovery and the defendant is unable to produce evidence in support of the defense, the 
plaintiff may move for Rule 11 sanctions).  For a discussion that Rule 11 should be used in 
lieu of a plausibility standard to deal with insufficient pleadings, see Lonny S. Hoffman, 
Burn Up the Chaff with Unquenchable Fire: What Two Doctrinal Intersections Can Teach 
Us About Judicial Power Over Pleadings, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1217, 1254 (2008) (“[A]n 
allegation that is implausible may also be said to violate Rule 11(b)(3) . . . .”);; Mize, supra 
note 51, at 1267 (arguing that Rule 11 can be used to “combat the frivolous and 
bothersome claims that were a partial reason for the Court raising the [pleading] 
standard”);; A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV. 431, 485–86 
(2008) (“[T]he Twombly Court’s statement that the plausibility standard would make sure 
that there is a ‘reasonably founded hope that the [discovery] process will reveal relevant 
evidence’ in support of the claim steps directly on the toes of Rule 11 because under that 
rule counsel already are certifying that asserted claims and allegations are warranted by 
the evidence . . . .” (footnote omitted) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 
559 (2007))).  The above-cited articles, admittedly, make a good argument that Rule 11 
can be used as a screening tool for pleadings. See Koly v. Enney, 269 F. App’x 861, 864 
(11th Cir. 2008) (noting the deterrence function of Rule 11).  However, this fails to take 
into account that Rule 11 is only as good as the pleading standard that it enforces.  Thus, 
if an affirmative defense is held to Conley’s notice standard, the Rule 11 deterrent 
function will necessarily be lesser than if affirmative defenses were held to Twombly’s and 
Iqbal’s plausibility standard. See Samuels v. Wilder, 906 F.2d 272, 274 (7th Cir. 1990) 
(holding that Rule 11 does not change the notice pleading standards of Conley); Donaldson 
v. Clark, 819 F.2d 1551, 1561 (11th Cir. 1987) (holding that Rule 11 under a notice 
pleading regime does not require the parties to allege the facts on which the case is 
based).  Therefore, Rule 11 may have some deterrent effect, but it cannot be treated as a 
substitute for a heightened pleading standard, but rather should be seen as a mechanism 
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These concerns are not equally present in a plaintiff who has 
been given years to decide when to file a complaint.  Therefore, 
as a plausibility standard unduly burdens a defendant, a lower 
bar for a defendant is necessarily required to truly balance this 
inequity.208 
D. It Is Unfair to the Plaintiff to Hold the Defendant to a Notice 
Standard Because the Plaintiff Still Needs to Conduct Discovery 
A valid critique of this Comment’s proposed rule is that if 
fairness to a defendant truly is the concern, then notice pleading 
should be adopted as its requirements can be met by merely 
labeling the affirmative defense correctly.209  However, notice 
pleading allows the most liberal scope to be applied at the 
discovery stage.210  A pleading system known for its ease of access 
to discovery211 would allow a defendant adversely to affect a 
plaintiff by pleading numerous affirmative defenses with “no 
‘reasonably founded hope that the [discovery] process will reveal 
relevant evidence’ to support” the defense.212  In the Institute for 
 
in which to enforce the applicable pleading standard. See Stephen R. Brown, 
Reconstructing Pleading: Twombly, Iqbal, and the Limited Role of the Plausibility Inquiry, 
43 AKRON L. REV. 1265, 1298 (2010) (footnote omitted) (noting that Rule 11 is not a 
pleading standard). 
 208 See Donoghue, supra note 199, at 11 (noting the inequity for plaintiffs and 
defendants regarding the time to respond and file complaints under the Rules).   
 209 See, e.g., Teirstein v. AGA Med. Corp., No. 6:08cv14, 2009 WL 704138, at *2 (E.D. 
Tex. Mar. 16, 2009) (noting that simply listing the affirmative defense correctly may be 
sufficient under a notice standard). 
 210 See Tim Oliver Brandi, The Strike Suit: A Common Problem of the Derivative Suit 
and the Shareholder Class Action, 98 DICK. L. REV. 355, 370 (1994) (discussing how broad 
access to discovery can easily be abused and lead to the filing of claims with no merits).  
See also FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 201, at 388–89  (describing the Rule’s broad 
discovery standards); William B. Rubenstein, The Concept of Equality in Civil Procedure, 
23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1865, 1879 (2002) (noting the ease of access to discovery under the 
Rules). 
 211 Rubenstein, supra note 210, at 1880.  When compared to common law and code 
pleading regimes, which focus on issue and factual development respectively, notice 
pleading, which is not concerned with issue or factual development at the pleading stage, 
has the easiest access to discovery of the three regimes. See Howard H. Wasserman, Civil 
Rights Plaintiffs and John Doe Defendants: A Study in Section 1983 Procedure, 25 
CARDOZO L. REV. 793, 806 (2003) (arguing that notice pleading is the broadest of the 
pleading regimes, as it easily allows a party to make it past the pleadings and into 
discovery). 
 212 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007) (quoting Dura Pharm., Inc. v. 
Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347 (2005)).  The concerns of the Twombly and Iqbal Courts 
regarding the costs of discovery do not disappear by simply raising the standard for a 
plaintiff only.  The same issues that led the Court to abandon the notice pleading 
standard of Conley would still survive if affirmative defenses were not held to a higher 
standard. See Paul J. Cleary, Summary Judgment in Oklahoma: Suggestions for 
Improving a “Disfavored” Procedure, 19 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 251, 271 n.103 (1994) (“With 
notice pleading and liberal amendment of pleadings, the motion to dismiss is an 
ineffective tool for screening meritless cases.”);; Richard L. Marcus, Reining in the 
American Litigator: The New Role of American Judges, 27 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. 
REV. 3, 10 (2003) (arguing that fact pleading restricts what can be alleged and narrows 
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the Advancement of the American Legal System survey, “[n]early 
half the respondents said that notice pleading has become a 
problem because extensive discovery is required to narrow the 
claims and defenses . . . .”213  Thus, such a notice standard would 
shift the scales dramatically and cause the plaintiff to be placed 
at a disparate disadvantage.214  The plaintiff still needs to 
conduct discovery, and as “the desire to avoid unnecessary 
discovery applies with equal force” to plaintiffs and defendants,215 
the defendant should not simply be allowed to throw any and all 
defenses “up against a wall to see what sticks.”216  This mindset 
is inconsistent with the Court’s current direction.217  Thus, this 
Comment proposes a standard that will have both plaintiff and 
defendant providing factual support for their complaints and 
affirmative defenses, respectively. 
CONCLUSION 
Admittedly, proposing a standard that permits a defendant 
to plead less than a plaintiff is at odds with certain notions of 
fairness and equality.  However, there are two definitive rules 
that can be taken away from the Twombly and Iqbal decisions: 
(1) only complaints are held to a plausibility standard;218 and (2) 
 
the issues into “rather specific allegations”);; Paul J. McArdle, A Short and Plain 
Statement: The Significance of Leatherman v. Tarrant County, 72 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 
19, 45 (1994) (“It has been suggested that by reason of the increase in the number of civil 
filings, the frequency of meritless or frivolous suits and the expense of federal litigation, it 
is best that the notice pleading theory of Rule 8 and Conley be abandoned for a return to 
fact pleading . . . .”).  However, a fact pleading standard for an affirmative defense will 
bring Rule 8(c) into line with the Court’s concerns regarding baseless claims and hopeless 
discovery. See Taruffo, supra note 172, at 675 (“When . . . a strict fact pleading rule is 
applied, much work has to be done by lawyers before filing a claim, and to decide whether 
or not there are facts sufficient to support the claim.”). 
 213 INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., supra note 166, at 4.  
Furthermore, according to the same survey, “[m]ore than 76 percent said that answers to 
complaints likewise do not accomplish the goal of narrowing issues.” Id. 
 214 See Mize, supra note 51, at 1260–61 (noting the imbalance in applying a lower 
standard to a defendant than to a plaintiff); Jane Perkins, Pleading Standards After Iqbal 
and Twombly, 43 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 507, 513–14 (2010) (noting the inherent disparity 
in applying such different standards to defendants and plaintiffs). 
 215 Lawrence-Hardy & Chapman, supra note 165. 
 216 A. Jennings Stone, III, Twombly and Iqbal: Good For Affirmative Defenses, Too?, 
VIRGIN IS. L. BLOG (Nov. 16, 2010, 11:45 AM), http://lawblog.vilaw.com/2010/11/articles/ 
litigation/twombly-and-iqbal-good-for-affirmative-defenses-too/. 
 217 Furthermore, the plaintiff, although with time to investigate, would still have to 
provide factual support to give a judge reason to believe the complaint is plausible, while 
the defendant would have to do little more than list the name of the affirmative defense 
correctly. Compare Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009) (holding that a 
complaint must state “a plausible claim for relief”), with Teirstein v. AGA Med. Corp., No. 
6:08cv14, 2009 WL 704138, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 16, 2009) (holding that under a notice 
standard, simply labeling the affirmative defense correctly may suffice).  This alone 
should cause one to hesitate to adopt such an inequitable standard for a defendant. 
 218 See supra Part IV(A) (noting the textual differences in Twombly, Iqbal, and 
Conley).   
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notice pleading is inadequate to deal with the costs of discovery 
today.219  However, requiring a defendant to uncover enough 
facts in twenty-one days to plead a plausible affirmative defense 
is unfair as compared to a plaintiff who may have years in which 
to plead a plausible claim for relief.220  Furthermore, holding an 
affirmative defense to a plausibility standard forces an attorney 
to make a decision between risking Rule 11 sanctions and risking 
the possibility that a desirable affirmative defense will not be 
plausible, and thus will be unavailable for trial and discovery.221  
As a defendant may lose the right to plead that defense if it is 
stricken or not pled from the outset,222 forcing such a 
requirement upon a defendant will only serve to discourage a 
true “decision on the merits.”223  It is also true though that 
affirmative defenses cannot be held to a notice standard, as that 
will inevitably conflict with the Court’s intention to use the 
pleadings to combat discovery costs and that would be grossly 
unfair to a plaintiff.224  Therefore, in order to remain fair to the 
plaintiff and the defendant,225 to combat discovery costs,226 and to 
remain consistent with Twombly and Iqbal,227 the only proper 
standard is to require “the defendant to plead an adequate 
factual basis for [his or her] affirmative defenses.”228 
 
 
 219 See supra Part IV(D) (describing notice pleading’s inability to combat discovery 
costs). 
 220 See supra notes 192–202 and accompanying text (noting that such a high standard 
is unfair to a defendant). 
 221 See supra notes 203–208 and accompanying text (discussing how Rule 11 and 
waiver of affirmative defenses place defendant’s attorneys in difficult and unfair 
positions). 
 222 See supra notes 200–202 and accompanying text (noting that defendants should 
include any and all defenses in the responsive pleading because they may otherwise not 
be allowed in as a defense). 
 223 Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 802 (Fed. Cir. 1999) 
(quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47–48 (1957), abrogated by Bell Atl. Corp. v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)). 
 224 See supra notes 156–162 and accompanying text (noting the effects of adopting 
notice pleading for defendants). 
 225 See supra Part IV(C) (noting the unfairness in applying Twombly and Iqbal to 
affirmative defenses). 
 226 See supra Part IV(B) (explaining that the purpose and effect of pleading facts is to 
provide the opposing party with enough information to efficiently narrow the scope of 
discovery). 
 227 See supra Part IV(B) (noting that a fact pleading standard is most in line with the 
policies behind the Twombly and Iqbal decisions). 
 228 Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Hibbing Taconite Co., 266 F.R.D. 260, 268 
(D. Minn. 2009). 
